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Online media have emerged as instrumental tools for citizen political behaviour worldwide. 
Research has shown that their usage has generated important democratic implications, particularly 
in relation to two specific behaviours: political participation and ideological extremism. However, 
the evidence showing a positive influence of online media use on participation, and its positive 
influence on extremism, seems somewhat contradictory. To date, these trends have only been 
studied separately. 
To evaluate the co-occurrence of these behavioural effects, the present study examines the 
influence of online media on political participation and extremism. The extent of these relations 
are explored by studying online media use as consumptive (reading, watching) and expressive 
(sharing, posting) activities. In order to explore the conditions that influence these behaviours, the 
analysis is applied cross-regionally. Using logistic and multiple regression models on cross-
sectional survey data from 47 Latin American and European countries in 2019, this study compares 
the effects of online media on seven political participation activities, and on left- and right-wing 
ideological extremism. 
The main findings reveal that online media use in Latin America and Europe predicts all 
seven political participation activities, and correlates with citizens’ self-reported placement at the 
ideological extremes. The correlations are stronger and more significant for online media 
expression than consumption. Cross-country contextual differences linked to internet penetration 
and democratic maturity show more variability across Latin American countries than across 
Europe. Overall, the co-occurrence of effects across regions suggests that online media use affects 
different political behaviours in similar ways. Wider democratic implications on citizen 
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Los medios de comunicación en línea (medios online) han surgido como una herramienta 
instrumental para entender el comportamiento político ciudadano a nivel global. Estudios 
empíricos han mostrado que su uso suscita implicaciones democráticas importantes, especialmente 
en relación con dos comportamientos específicos: la participación política y el extremismo 
ideológico. Sin embargo, los hallazgos que demuestran la influencia positiva del uso de medios 
online en la participación, así como su influencia positiva en el extremismo, parecen algo 
contradictorios. Hasta la fecha, estas tendencias sólo han sido estudiadas por separado. 
Para evaluar la concurrencia de dichos comportamientos políticos, el presente estudio 
examina la influencia simultánea de medios online en la participación política y en el extremismo. 
El alcance de estas influencias se analiza a través de actividades de consumo (leer, ver) y de 
expresión (compartir, publicar) en línea. Para explorar las condiciones que influyen en estos 
comportamientos, el análisis se aplica de forma interregional. Utilizando modelos de regresión 
logística y múltiple sobre datos de encuestas transversales de 47 países latinoamericanos y europeos 
en 2019, este estudio compara los efectos de medios online en siete actividades de participación 
política, y en el extremismo ideológico de izquierda y de derecha. 
Los principales hallazgos del presente estudio revelan que el uso de medios online en 
América Latina y Europa predice las siete actividades de participación política estudiadas, y se 
correlaciona con el auto-posicionamiento ideológico extremista. Las correlaciones son más fuertes 
y significativas para la expresión en medios online que para el consumo de información. Las 
diferencias contextuales entre países muestran más variabilidad en América Latina que en Europa, 
debido a disparidades en acceso al internet y madurez democrática. En general, esta concurrencia 
de efectos positivos entre regiones sugiere que el uso de medios online afecta comportamientos 
políticos diferentes de manera similar. Se discute sobre las implicaciones democráticas de la 





Medios de comunicación en línea, participación política, ideología, extremismo, comportamiento 





“We have become accustomed to greeting the new, including new technology, via the discursive polarities of utopia 





Background and Research Questions 
 
Online media have emerged as instrumental tools for acquiring information and 
communicating worldwide. From the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa, Occupy 
Wall Street in the U.S., the Indignados 15-M movement in Spain, Passelivre in Brazil, Yosoy132 
in Mexico, to Lastesis in Chile, organised collective action has become synonymous with the use 
of online media in the twenty first century. This increasing reliance on online media for political 
action has become the dominant feature of a body of political research investigating the influence 
of technology on citizen behaviour. Online media is defined in this study as internet connected 
platforms that facilitate information and communication between individual profile accounts, on 
the world wide web and via social media. 
The use of online media by electoral candidates, particularly from populist and extremist 
leanings, has also garnered attention in academia. Supporters of these parties have fuelled fears of 
rising political intolerance and violence, as online media have increasingly hosted hate speech and 
misinformation. As a result, online tools have been linked to the two distinct socio-political 
phenomena that have been affecting democracies across the globe: citizen collective action and 
opposition intolerance (Miller, 2020). Disagreements over the extent of the influence of online 
media on citizen behaviours has generated a divide in academia (Tucker et al., 2018). On the one 
hand, cyber-optimists have commented on the informative and mobilising potential of these tools, 
as gateways to more direct systems of democracy. On the other hand, cyber-pessimists have 
warned against the violence, division and deception that they foster among increasingly polarised 
users (Hindman, 2008). We define political ‘polarisation’ as the deepening of ideological conflicts 
in a society, marked by divisions in political opinion within electorates or party-systems. A third 
approach pursued by some scholars has been more nuanced, seeking to better understand the 
complex interplay between citizen behaviour, online media use and political institutions. This last 
area of research has arguably produced the most enriching findings (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2019; 
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Postill, 2018; Valenzuela et al., 2019; Yang et al., 2016). This paper aspires to contribute to this last 
body of understanding.  
 
Below, we briefly situate the present paper within the body of research that examines the 
effects of online media on political behaviour. The idea that media channels shape consumers’ 
political engagement and actions is not new, and the effects of newspapers, radio, and television 
on political behaviour are well documented in the literature (Liang & Nordin, 2012; Putnam, 2000). 
Yet, the novel feature of online media compared to previous technological advances is its 
interactive nature. Indeed, recent scholarship has emphasised the importance of the duality of 
learning and discussion that take place in online media (Hoewe & Peacock, 2020). Theoretical 
perspectives on political knowledge acquisition and interactive communication networks have 
brought further insight. According to cognitive theoretical frameworks, learning about politics 
drives individuals into political action. However, the strength of the relation between learning and 
taking action is determined by the placement of political knowledge into conversation within social 
networks. This is the communicative element that online media contribute to subsequent political 
behaviour. Inspired by the communication mediation model (McLeod et al., 2001), Shah and 
colleagues (2005) theorise that online users’ learning (consumption of political information) and 
discussion (self-expression within social networks) are driven by the gratification they expect from 
their online interactions. Empirical evidence has provided support for the complementary theory 
that online media use can act as key precursors of offline political participation (Boulianne, 2015; 
Diehl et al., 2016; Shah, 2016). ‘Political participation’ is the sum of actions taken by citizens to 
influence politically binding decisions (this includes voting, campaigning, protesting, and 
petitioning, among other activities). Based on extensive studies, it can be confidently said, that 
online media have become important tools for citizen political participation (Boulianne, 2017). It 
is worth noting however, that aside from a limited selection of cross-national studies, a large 
proportion of this work has been carried out in the U.S.  
The two fundamental features of using online media, consumption and expression, have 
also brought scholar’s attention to their potentially polarising effects. Online media differ from 
traditional mass media in the way that they offer political information to consumers because of 
their high-choice environments. Online spaces are filled with varied political perspectives, which 
encourage individuals to select sources and interlocutors that align with their opinions. Based on 
the theory of cognitive dissonance, scholars have suggested that online media reduce the range of 
viewpoints individuals are exposed to, both in the information they consume and in the 
conversations in which they express themselves, due to a cognitive tendency towards selective 
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exposure (Nie et al., 2010). In addition to the cognitive argument, research has also shown that 
the structure of online media platforms shapes political behaviour (Dutton et al., 2017; Sunstein, 
2018). Online media algorithms reduce the variety of individuals’ information consumption and 
self-expression through the production of personalised, tailor-made content. Both cognitive and 
platform structure theories perceive online media as enclosing individuals into groups of like-
minded opinions. This characteristic has been linked to reduced tolerance for opposing ideologies 
(Quattrociocchi et al., 2016), and increased ideological extremism in users (Bright, 2017). 
‘Extremism’ is conceived here as the appropriation of ideological beliefs and association to political 
groups that identify on the extremes of the ideology spectrum. Contradictory findings have refuted 
the cognitive and structural theories, arguing that individuals are predominantly exposed to mixed 
political views in online media, and that consumption and expression online lead to political 
centrism instead (Barberá, 2015). To date, the debate in the literature has not produced an 
explanation for these conflicting results. This may be because the number of studies that have 
investigated the relation between online media use and citizens’ ideological extremism is limited. 
The global rise in extremism makes studying the factors influencing its presence important and 
relevant. We therefore raise the following research questions to be answered in our study: does 
online media use directly relate to ideological extremism? If so, is there a difference between 
consumption and expression of political content online? Can the relation between online media 
use and political participation co-occur with ideological extremism? And can these relationships 
be generalised to different world regions? 
 
Aims and Hypotheses 
 
This paper will investigate the use of online media through two distinct activities: 
consumption and expression. In the first part of the study, it aims to replicate previous findings 
on the influence of online media on citizen political participation. In the second part, it explores 
the relationship between online media use and ideological extremism. The study develops a 
framework of co-occurring behaviour effects, by examining survey data from two different regions 
of the world, Latin America and Europe.  
In line with the above stated research questions, four hypotheses are presented. The study’s 
quantitative analyses are hypothesised to show that: online political consumption is weakly related to 
offline political participation, and weakly related to ideological extremism; online political expression 
is strongly associated to offline political participation and strongly associated to ideological 
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extremism; these relationships are believed to exist in both Latin American and European regions, 
taking into account some context-specific variance. 
 
Research Overview and Structure 
 
Scholars that study the role of online media use on political behaviour have generally 
evaluated its effects on political participation separately from its effects on extremism. Our study’s 
innovative approach will investigate the behavioural influence of online media using a quantitative 
method, which analyses the influence of online media on participation and extremism using the 
same datasets, in order to connect the academic subfields of the two political behaviours. The 
purpose of this method is to contribute to the nuanced approach to understanding online media 
as a tool that can shape citizen behaviour in different ways at the same time. 
The choice of Latin America and Europe for the present analysis is justified through these 
regions’ political contexts. Both Latin America and Europe have shown recent peaks in political 
participation, notably in the form of protest, as well as a rise in ideological extremism, observed 
through the varying levels of electoral success of extremist parties and candidates (Sullet-Nylander 
et al., 2019). Latin America democratised more recently than Western Europe, and has shown a 
similarly volatile structuration of party-system ideologies to Central and Eastern Europe (Kitschelt 
et al., 2010). Access to online media in Latin America is more recent than in Europe, but the use 
of these tools for political behaviour has already been shown to be instrumental (Valenzuela et al., 
2016, p. 705). Aside from the comparable contexts these regions provide to the research project, 
the choice is also influenced by the author’s academic interests. This study was conceived as part 
of the completion of the Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degree ‘Latin America and Europe in a 
Global World’ (LAGLOBE), and its focus is the result of analyses developed throughout the 
degree at the Universidad de Salamanca, Stockholm Universitet, and Sorbonne-Nouvelle Paris 3. 
 
This present research is designed using a quantitative and comparative method. Data are 
drawn from two main open source databases, the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
‘AmericasBarometer’ survey and the European Social Survey. The methodology employed is 
modelled on previous political participation studies that have used surveys in the U.S. (Gil de 
Zúñiga et al., 2012), Western Europe (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2018) and Latin America (Valenzuela, 
2013). Regression analyses are run to estimate the relations between online media use and political 
participation, as well as online media use and ideological extremism. Variables of political 
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participation, extremism and online media use are designed based on the two regions’ survey 
questions, in a way that facilitates comparison. 
 
To address the stated research questions, this paper is divided into six chapters. The first 
chapter defines and analyses key concepts, which provide a theoretical basis for our investigation 
on citizen political behaviour. Important concepts that are reviewed include citizen participation, 
ideological self-placement and mass media. The chapter also provides a brief introduction to the 
contemporary democratic contexts of Latin America and Europe, and justifies the present study’s 
chosen method of survey analysis. 
The second chapter lays out theoretical frameworks of political participation, drawing on 
models of social capital, civic culture, and cognitive communication to explain the motives behind 
citizen engagement towards participation. Studies that examine the effects of online media on 
political participation as informational tools and as communicative tools are examined, in order to 
gauge potential implications for democracy.  
The third chapter looks at methodological and theoretical approaches to studying political 
ideology and extremism in individuals. A distinction is made on the terminology of extremism and 
populism, as well as fragmentation and polarisation. This facilitates the subsequent examination 
of the recent evidence of the influence of online media use on citizens’ ideology. The reviewed 
studies interpret the influence of online media on ideology as a result of cognitive predisposition 
of users, and online platform structure. A model to represent two conflicting accounts in the 
literature on the relationship between online media and extremism is designed and presented. At 
the end of chapters two and three, historical contexts of citizen political participation and 
extremism in Latin America and Europe are provided, to develop the cross-regional comparison. 
Chapter four is concerned with the methodology applied for the paper’s study. The datasets 
are described, and set up to fit the research questions. In chapter five, the results of the descriptive 
statistics and regressions are presented. Analyses demonstrate that both consumption and 
expression of political content online positively relate to participation and extremism, in Latin 
America and Europe. The extent of each relation is detailed. 
Finally, chapter six discusses the study’s findings, key contributions and wider implications, 
in line with the previously reviewed literature. Differences between regions and between countries 
are identified and evaluated. Limitations in the research design are pinpointed and 
recommendations for future analysis are suggested, in the hopes of better understanding the 




1. Key concepts, context and research design 
 
1.1. Political behaviour: the participation of the individual in politics 
 
Democracy, a concept derived from the Greek dimos (public) and kratos (rule), is often 
interpreted as a system of government that maximises the inclusion of citizen political behaviour 
in political decisions (Papacharissi, 2010, p. 11). 
 
Democratic or not, all polities expect some public involvement in the political process, if only to obey 
political orders […]. Democracy, however, expects more active involvement […] because democracy is 
designed to aggregate public preferences into binding collective decisions (Dalton & Klingemann, 
2007, p. 14). 
 
The study of political behaviour strives to quantify and understand the factors that influence 
citizens’ political opinions and choices. Factors that influence citizen behaviour can be systemic, 
as the above citation suggests, or contextual. Context is defined by the environmental and 
demographic forces that push individuals towards their political preferences. For example, 
environmental factors can include the ideas and information transmitted through family, friends, 
teachers and news media; demographic factors can include sex, age, income, ethnicity and religion. 
Together, these factors form an individual’s social identity. Social identity theory posits that the 
outcome of forming an identity leads individuals to associate or dissociate to different political 
groups and parties (Greene, 2004). In theory, democratic political systems benefit from the identity 
differences between groups and parties, because it facilitates the alignment of citizen concerns 
with party representation in government (Dahl, 1978). The ability for governments and parties to 
gauge citizen preferences depends on the motivation and engagement of populations to voice their 
demands and participate in civic activities that interest them. Thus, the participation of the public 
in political activities connects the individual to the general political system (Almond & Verba, 
1963). The literature separates citizen participative behaviour into civic and political participation: 
civic participation refers to community actions that are not directly related to governance (e.g. 
communal and parochial activities), whereas political participation is composed of community 
actions that aim to directly affect governing policy (e.g. electoral and party activities) (Skoric et al., 
2016). We define political participation for this study as: the actions voluntarily taken by an 
individual or group, to influence politically binding decisions, through conventional or 
unconventional activities (Carreras & Bowler, 2019; Linssen et al., 2014; Vaccari & Valeriani, 2018). 
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The term unconventional political participation was coined to include contentious forms of 
participation, such as attending a political protest, boycotting products or taking part in strikes, 
that increased in the 1960s (Verba & Nie, 1972).  
 
The formation of social identities and engagement into political participation are facilitated 
through communication. Philosophers have highlighted the importance of communicative 
exchange for the development of democracy. In Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of political action 
in ancient Greece, speech was the most critical participative action citizens could make (Martin, 
2015). According to Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action, democracy relies on the 
public sphere, in which rational argumentation can take place in equal, fair and free exchanges 
between individuals (Love, 1989). Within this framework, three of the four habermasian spheres 
relate to citizen political participation: i. conversation within communities that share values (civic 
participation), ii. discussion in groups of concerned individuals (conventional political 
participation), and iii. empowerment of marginalised groups through protests (unconventional 
political participation) (Wessler, 2019). Communication is also important for identity and idea 
formation. Michel Foucault asserts that discourse and discussion use ideology to incite illusions of 
truth and power (Love, 1989). Ideas and ideology determine citizens’ concerns about society, and 
stimulate the means and motivation to participate. We briefly define this concept below.  
 
1.2. Ideology and cleavage theory 
 
Ideology is an abstract term that denominates the means by which individuals of diverse 
backgrounds think about politics (Freeden, 2013). According to Michel Foucault, discourse forms 
the basis of how ideas are conceptualised, hierarchised and processed “as the terrain in which 
people become conscious [of politics]” (Purvis & Hunt, 1993, p. 489). Communication theories 
conceptualise ideology as the product of perceived hierarchies in social relations, and as a political 
weapon to frame one-sided perspectives on divisive topics such as abortion, or even to draw 
distinctions between political groups (e.g. ‘us vs. them’). 
 
Political theory investigates ideology either in terms of modern political economy or in terms 
of models of political choice (Hinich & Munger, 1996). Political choice theory complements 
communication theories in that it examines the contents and wider implications of ideologies on 
political policies and political groups. Here, ideology is interpreted as a set of values that define 
and constrict political parties and citizens, and holds them accountable for their behaviour (Martin, 
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2015). To understand how ideology influences the political process, it is best evaluated in terms of 
citizen-party relations. For citizens, ideology serves as a map to take a stand on an issue or policy 
(Bauer et al., 2017; Martin, 2015), ultimately helping them to define their political preference and 
make participative decisions (namely, during elections) (Kitschelt et al., 2010). When citizens make 
a political choice, the consequence affects more than party elections, it is also the placement of a 
temporary mandate of affairs, the setting of an agenda for foreseeable debates (Hinich & Munger, 
1996, p. x).  
For parties, ideology is a reflection of the relation between the perception of political 
‘demands’ voiced by the electorate, and the subsequent attempts to ‘supply’ representation of these 
sentiments. Cleavage theory suggests that parties define their ideology along socio-cultural divides 
(Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Echoing social identity theory, parties reflect the separation for other 
groups into friends and enemies, symbolising the contours of the in-group and out-groups (Martin, 
2015). Geddes (2003) extends cleavage theory to Latin America (a concept originally fashioned for 
Western Europe), explaining that the presence of cleavages between parties is also applicable in 
other democratic regions. The concept of ideological dimensions, further discussed in chapter 3, 
typically places ideologies and parties on a continuum (Sartori, 2005). Although the duality of 
party-systems is not a necessary outcome, the opposition of ideologies facilitates the choice of 
political options. According to Downsian theory, uncertain and uninformed citizens can count on 
this duality as a means to make an electoral choice (Hinich & Munger, 1996). The extent and 
positioning of individuals within party contour lines depends on individual-level demographic 
characteristics, wealth and social identity, as well as the conditions of the wider socio-economic 
context in which they reside (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2004). 
 
We define political ideology in this study as three fundamental components that are in 
concert: i. the discussion that informs and forms beliefs, ideals and principles, ii. the appropriation 
of beliefs and their attribution to political groups, iii. the actions taken in accordance with these 
beliefs by individuals and parties (Hinich & Munger, 1996; Mouffe, 1979). The processes that drive 
citizens to politically participate and build political ideology rely on citizens obtaining information 
to form social identity and to associate with political parties. The assimilation of political 





1.3. Mass media: shaping participation and ideology 
 
The principal precursor of citizen political behaviour is the process of forming opinions and 
identity in politics. Opinions are formed around political knowledge, which is acquired formally 
through education and informally through the media. News media expose citizens to conflicting 
viewpoints, and promote reflection across political cleavages (D. C. Mutz & Martin, 2001). A 
politically informed public depends on accessible and engaging communication, made available 
through diverse and competing media channels (Delli Carpini, 2005). Almond and Verba (1963, p. 
79) classify individuals’ awareness and knowledge of the political system as “political cognition”. 
Technological advances have generated debate on the evolving effects of mass media on citizen 
political cognition and behaviour. Mass media include the printed press, radio, television, and for 
the past 25 years, the internet. Before the internet and online news, scholars were already debating 
the effects of new technology on citizens. Putnam (1995) associated the decline in political 
knowledge and participation in the U.S. during the 1950s to the 1990s to the rise in television 
usage and decrease in morality and trust. He asserted that this was due to the predominantly 
commercialised and leisurely content found on television. Other scholars saw this trend of 
disaffection and cynicism, or ‘videomalaise’, to be caused by growing negativism in television 
journalism (Norris, 2000). With the rise in internet use, Putnam (2000) foresaw the same 
predicament as commercial television, categorising it as a tool oriented mostly for entertainment, 
and deeming it to be distracting from political engagement. But an increased internet use is not 
quite comparable to television use, as online platforms allow for political socialisation through 
virtual interactional activities. This is the crucial element that makes the internet an important tool 
to study. The multifaceted uses of the internet mean one can seek information or participate in 
social exchanges, manage personal affairs, and be entertained, simultaneously. To understand this 
interactional element, we briefly examine the literature on the influence of the internet and social 
media on citizen political cognition and behaviour. 
 
The influence of the internet 
 
Early research on the internet and news media showed that the web did not initially replace 
the consumption of political information from traditional media (Althaus & Tewksbury, 2000). 
But the growth in internet use for news, particularly in younger adults, inspired interest in its 
mobilising potential. Studies mostly carried out in the U.S., positively linked internet use to political 
knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 2002; Shah et al., 2005), and political participation (Boulianne, 
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2009; Wang, 2007). The relation was seen as the democratising effect of the internet, as internet 
access provided a reduced cost for information seeking, and the horizontality of information 
available on search engines expanded news attention. But concerns for differences in political 
knowledge arose, across individuals with less access or use of the internet (Anduiza et al., 2012; 
Delli Carpini & Keeter, 2002). In a large-scale 108-country study, Ahmed and colleagues (2020) 
demonstrated that though access to the internet generally increased political engagement 
worldwide, it also deepened the socioeconomic gap between digitally connected individuals. 
 
The influence of social media 
 
Social media are defined as online services that allow individuals to create a profile, define 
the number of other profiles with whom to connect, and freely interact with these networks 
(Xenos et al., 2014, p. 152). Unlike the fixed content found on the previous web generation, social 
media are characterised by the contribution of the receiver as well as the emitter (Anduiza et al., 
2012). Although most of the exchanges that takes place on social media are not related to politics 
(Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012), the platforms provide regular opportunities to engage with news-
related content, and promote political cognition (Lu et al., 2016, p. 76). Most importantly, the 
element of interaction resonates with the idea of the public sphere, or online public sphere 
(Papacharissi, 2010). Communicative exchanges within networks can redefine citizens’ 
understanding on civil, political and social ideas. However, the online communication 
environment is unstable and contributions are unbalanced. Where some citizens are compelled to 
seek political information actively and contact political figures through their profile accounts, 
others passively come across information and contribute to collective action through minimal 
effort (dubbed ‘clicktivism’). This brings us to distinguish between two online communicative 
behaviours: political consumption and expression. 
Political consumption is the act of informing oneself on political news through reading, 
listening, or watching media content; whereas political expression is the process of using online 
platforms to interact with other individuals or groups to discuss, reflect on and debate political 
ideas (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2013). Online political behaviour research has shown that consumption 
and expression have different effects on political knowledge and participation. Where an 
uninterested individual can incidentally come across and learn about political information online 
(Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018; Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009), another politically interested individual can 
easily create or participate in discussions and activities (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012). Unlike 
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traditional media, the simple habit of spending time online can lead to involvement in offline 
political activities (Jung et al., 2011). 
 
We expand on the findings linking online media to political participation in chapter 2. When 
looking at the link between online media and ideology however, results have been conflicting. This 
conflict, reviewed in chapter 3, provides the basis for the paradox that will be investigated in this 
study. In both chapters, we find that the majority of studies have been carried out in the U.S. and 
Western Europe, and no research has been developed on cross-regional comparison. Therefore, 
in order to contribute to the gap in the literature,  we reproduce methods used to detect online 
media influence on political participation and apply them to Latin America and Western and 
Eastern Europe. The same method is then used to examine the link between online media use and 
ideological extremism. This methodological approach of comparative political analysis using 
regional political behaviour surveys will now be discussed. 
 
1.4. Comparing political behaviour across regions 
 
According to the Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour “the study of mass political 
behaviour has a deceptively simple objective – to establish the causes and consequences of the 
political values and behaviours of the general population” (Curtice, 2007, p. 1). To explain 
differences between social and government systems’ influence on citizen political behaviour, 
researchers often resort to cross-country survey comparison. Cross-country political research is 
beneficial in that it enables generalisability and broadens understanding of contextual factors.  
The objective of the comparative method is to observe political circumstances in more than 
one social system and to measure effects of structural and environmental factors (Przeworski, 
2009). To improve the reliability of results, maximising the number of cases is recommended. 
However, this may lead to the limited control for unobservable variables, and in the case of 
comparative survey research, the variation in the implementation of survey interviews can 
introduce skews in the results. Yet, studying cross-country data remains advantageous, as large-N 
cross-cultural data permits a distancing from researcher bias (Lijphart, 1975, p. 170). Regional 
comparative research is considered more reliable than global comparison, because it reduces 
cultural misinterpretations in survey questions (Curtice, 2007). 
Almond and Verba's (1963) seminal cross-country study on citizen political behaviour on 
‘The Civic Culture’ is lauded for its methodological design (Dalton, 2008, p. 14), which 
subsequently inspired a plethora of studies on civic and political participation using survey data 
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(Dalton & Klingemann, 2007). The present study contributes to this legacy, where it compares the 
relations of two types of citizen political behaviours with two forms of online political activity 
(consumption and expression) across 47 countries. An original aspect of our research is that it 
compares multiple citizen behaviours across two geographical regions, Latin America (including 
the Caribbean) and Europe. Although the two regions host very different settings (political 
trajectories, economic production models, public welfare systems, etc.), they also share political 
lexicon (left-right nomenclature, approach to international trade, religion), and importantly, recent 
political tensions (rising civil unrest and populism). Our approach aims to deliver a large-scale 
comparative perspective.  
 
We explore regional contextual similarities and differences throughout the paper, starting 
here with a brief examination of contemporary commonalities and differences in Latin American 
and European democratic context. Hereafter, we provide a summary of the current state of 
democratic liberties (relating to political participation), extremist tensions, and internet access in 
our two regions of interest. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index report labels 
the year 2019 as a year of democratic stagnation or decline, due to a decrease in participatory 
democracy, widening of ideological gaps between political elites and electorates, and a reduction 
in civil liberties (EIU, 2020). A rise in popular protests in Latin America and Eastern Europe is 
noted, along with a drop in civil liberties in Latin America (freedom of speech, press and assembly). 
Demonstrations in Latin America were driven by clashes over electoral fraud, corruption and 
austerity measures. In Western Europe, there is a rise in support for extremist parties, and in some 
countries, strenuous efforts to form coalition governments (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain). Despite concerns for deterioration of democracy in the EIU report, no drastic 
changes in the indices in Latin America and Europe were seen over previous years. Northern and 
Western European countries were generally classified as ‘full democracies’1, with only five that 
classified as ‘flawed democracies’. In Eastern Europe, no full democracies are registered, and the 
report ranks the regions as having twelve flawed democracies and nine hybrid regimes (mostly in 
the Caucasus). In Latin America, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Chile were classified as ‘full 
democracies’, whereas Honduras, Guatemala, Bolivia and Haiti ranked as ‘hybrid regimes’, 
Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba as ‘authoritarian’, and the remaining 14 countries were categorised 
as ‘flawed democracies’. Latin America remained the most democratic emerging-market region 
worldwide, after North America and Western Europe.  
 
1 Ranking from most to least democratic: full democracy, flawed democracy, hybrid regime, authoritarian (EIU, 
2020) 
 21 
In the 2019 Freedom House report on civil liberties, press was considered generally freer in 
Europe than in Latin America (Freedom House, 2019). But it warns against the increasing grip of 
populist leaders on press freedom, particularly in right-wing populist governments in Hungary and 
Serbia. Waves of protests in Latin America in 2019 were seen as a sign of growing civil liberty. 
According to the 2020 Reuters Institute Digital News Report, access to internet and social 
media is unevenly distributed in Latin America, with between 66% (Mexico) and 93% (Argentina) 
internet penetration (but only four countries are surveyed), as well as in Europe with internet 
connectivity between 67% (Bulgaria) to 98% (Denmark and Norway) (Newman et al., 2020). 
Access to technology is also unequal within Latin American countries, with affluent citizens and 
men being more likely to use internet and social media (Mitchelstein et al., 2020). The Reuters 
Institute reports the risk of misinformation spread through online platforms is more pronounced 
in Latin America than Europe (Newman et al., 2020, p. 20). 
 
The above summary of democratic indicators leads us to expect similarly high levels of 
political participation in both regions, but different average positions and polarisation of 
ideological orientations in citizens, with regards to the rise of right-wing extremism in Europe and 
left and right-wing populism in Latin America. The usage of internet and social media are unequally 
spread in both regions, although Europe has a higher overall connectivity among its populations. 
With this context, the link between political participation, ideological extremism and online media 
will now be explored further, in order to formulate our hypotheses. 
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2. Political participation  
 
In this chapter, we first explore the theoretical frameworks of citizens’ political participation, 
and review evidence which supports different debates on political participation in a digital age. 
Secondly, we look at the literature on citizen participation in the Latin American and European 
regions, and provide a contextual overview of their transitions to democratic political behaviour, 
first offline and then online. 
 
2.1. Theory  
 
2.1.1. Theoretical frameworks of political participation 
 
Political scientists have long viewed political participation as an essential aspect of the quality 
of the democratic process, as it is the ultimate ‘check and balance’ that holds authorities 
accountable for their actions (Linssen et al., 2014; Lu et al., 2016).  
 
Pateman has argued, drawing upon central notions in Rousseau and J. S. Mill, that participatory 
democracy fosters human development, enhances a sense of political efficacy, reduces a sense of 
estrangement from power centres, nurtures a concern for collective problems and contributes to the 
formation of an active and knowledgeable citizenry capable of taking a more acute interest in 
government affairs. (Held, 2006, p. 468). 
 
 But the importance assigned to citizen participation by Pateman clashed with 1970s theories 
of representative democracy. Representative democracy theory assumes that any democratic 
system that implements universal suffrage results in citizen participation. A growing number of 
scholars however, argued that free and fair elections were not the only key feature of democracy, 
and contended that certain individuals in society were systematically restricted from participating 
in political and civic life (Held, 2006, p. 463). Citizen participation research then showed that a 
disengaged and uninterested population increased unequal representation, which systematically 
biased the system in favour of wealthier and more educated citizens (Lijphart, 1997). Democracy 
scholars also worried about indifferent citizens because of their reduced political cognition and 
vulnerability to manipulation by news media (Papacharissi, 2010, p. 82). Scholarship on political 
participation thus re-oriented towards better understanding the motives and factors that caused 
these differences in citizen participation. 
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One fundamental factor is the notion of social capital. A term popularised in the 1990s, by 
authors such as James Coleman, Robert Putnam and Pierre Bourdieu, it refers to the sum of 
relations of an individual, composed of weak and strong ties, nurtured through regular interactions, 
which builds a sense of societal belonging (Norris, 2000; Plascencia, 2005; Verba et al., 1995). 
These networks are a resource that individuals can access for collective action and problem-solving 
(Shah et al., 2005, p. 533; Skoric et al., 2016, p. 1820). The accessibility and strength of the ties is 
moderated by interpersonal trust within a community. Putnam (2000) explained that social capital 
leads citizens to pursue common political interests and concerns, which expands political cognition. 
Empirical studies have positively linked social capital to conventional forms of participation, such 
as voting and contacting elected representatives (Carreras & Bowler, 2019), and have suggested 
that political participation and social capital are mutually conducive (Skoric et al., 2016). 
Social capital and interpersonal trust rely on a belief that citizens’ networks can exert 
sufficient pressure to influence politics, also known as political efficacy (Almond & Verba, 1963). 
The requirement for political efficacy is that citizens believe they understand government and can 
influence policy issues (Karp & Banducci, 2008). “If people know opportunities exist for effective 
participation in decision-making, they are likely to believe participation is worthwhile, likely to 
participate actively and likely, in addition, to hold that collective decisions should be binding” 
(Held, 2006, p. 469). Over the past decades, social surveys have included measures of social capital 
and political efficacy as gauges of political opinion, through self-reported scales of interpersonal 
social trust and political trust. 
For a long time, the measurement of political participation in political science was limited to 
voting: ‘voter turnout’ to represent political interest, and ‘voter choice’, to represent ideological 
preference. Literature emphasised questions on the mechanisms that could increase voter turnout. 
Findings included proportional election systems, infrequent elections and compulsory voting 
(Lijphart, 1997). However, voting is an incomplete measure of political participation. In hybrid 
regimes, voting measures do not account for the repression of other basic civil liberties, and in the 
case of a disenchanted population, falling voter turnout might be compensated by unconventional 
forms of participation. Measurement of unconventional modes of participation include boycotting, 
petitioning, contacting local or national representatives, wearing or holding political messages, 
funding or donating to a party or political association and joining or working in political and 
community meetings, parties, and organisations (Chadwick & Howard, 2010; Linssen et al., 2014; 
Norris, 2011). The range of actions individuals can take outside the electoral cycles offers them 
opportunities to increase their political efficacy and in theory, restore political trust (Dalton, 2008). 
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Cognitive theoretical frameworks emphasise the importance of communication networks in 
motivating individuals into political participation. According to the cognitive mobilisation model, 
citizens’ understanding of politics is determined by communication networks, established through 
structures of education and mass media (Inglehart, 1970). In the civic voluntarism model, 
individuals use cognitive resources, in addition to socioeconomic resources, to engage 
psychologically with politics and community networks (Verba et al., 1995). The cognitive 
mediation model predicts that the extent of political learning from news media is mediated by 
cognitive variables (Eveland, 2001). But none of these models explain how individuals go from 
learning about politics to engaging with politics (the link is only assumed). Douglas McLeod and 
colleagues’ (2001) communication mediation model, complements these cognitive frameworks by 
arguing that news media consumption leads to political participation when placed in conversation 
within social networks (political expression). Empirical evidence demonstrates that political 
conversation among individuals is fundamental for citizen engagement, and mediates the effects 
of news consumption (Shah et al., 2007, 2017). The introduction of new media on populations has 
shown an increase in political participation. For example, Gentzkow and colleagues (2011) found 
a positive relation between voter turnout and the introduction of a new newspaper in the U.S. 
longitudinal study. Radio use has been found to positively correlate with political participation in 
the U.S. (Strömberg, 2004), and with voter turnout in 60 developing countries (Vergne, 2011). 
Conversely, the introduction of television has been associated with a decline in voter turnout 
(Gentzkow, 2006) as Putnam (2000) had forewarned, however, the opposite effect has also been 
shown (Prat & Strömberg, 2005). Thus, it is important to review evidence on the influence of the 
latest media to influence political participation: the internet and social media. 
 
2.1.2. Political participation in a digital age 
 
At the turn of the millennium, digital technology was seen as a promising tool for 
communication and networking, providing opportunities for activities that fostered political 
knowledge and participation. The optimism of the early 2000 turned into ‘cyberpessimism’ over 
the real effects of the internet and social media (hereafter referred to as online media) on political 
participation (Hindman, 2008). We group these debates into three areas: online media effects on 





Participation effect of online media as informational tools 
 
Similarly to the 1960s, the 1990s experienced a drop in conventional political engagement, 
and particularly in the global North. Around the same time, the internet became increasingly 
accessible, and offered citizens a new way to interact with information (Dalton & Klingemann, 
2007). Political news and opinion online gained interest from the media and academia, as a result 
of the exponential rise in citizen attention paid to webpages and online networks. This new form 
of information exposure was considered more influential on citizen participation than any previous 
medium before it, because it allowed for asynchronous encounters and unfiltered content to be 
shared by trusted networks of friends and family, which encouraged offline political discussion 
and reflection (Diehl et al., 2016; Shah, 2016, p. 14). But, some scholars warned against the 
reification of citizens’ use of online news and media, asserting that online tools were both 
empowering and restricting political behaviours in users (Papacharissi, 2010, p. 104). We briefly 
mention some of these effects.  
 
Participation effect of online media as communicative discourse tools 
 
Over the last twenty years, numerous survey and panel studies have established a link 
between online media use and political participation (Boulianne, 2009; Jost et al., 2018; Shah et al., 
2005; Valenzuela, 2013; Xenos et al., 2014, to cite a few). For example, experimental evidence has 
established a causal link between internet use and voting (Jones et al., 2017), and between social 
media use and petition signing (Coppock et al., 2016). In a U.S. survey study that finds that social 
media use is positively related to protest, Boulianne and colleagues (2020b) argue that it is the 
multi-functionality of online media that allows citizens to learn about specific events, discuss 
political issues of interest, and reach out to or be invited by networks to participate in political 
events, all within the same online spaces. To illustrate this dynamic process, Shah and colleagues 
(2005) designed a model of communication and citizen participation, to theorise on the directional 
influence of online media political activities on civic participation (see Figure 1). The model 
predicts that the choice and motivation behind individuals’ media consumption (seeking online 
information, watching television, reading newspapers) are driven by the gratification they expect 
from online interactions (through messaging and discussion) (Shah et al., 2005, pp. 534–535). 
Findings from a recent 133 study meta-analysis has provided additional evidence to understand 
the dynamics between learning and interacting online and political participation offline. In it, 
Boulianne (2017) shows that depending on the activity, whether obtaining information online 
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(consumption) or discussing politics within online networks (expression), the effect of media 
platform use on political participation offline varies. Both online activities are significant, but 
Boulianne (2017) demonstrates that online political expression is more strongly related to offline 
participation, than online political consumption. Suggesting that “it is not the media per se that 
can affect individuals’ social capital and engagement, but the specific ways in which individuals use 
media” (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012, p. 321).  
 
Figure 1. Theorised Model of Communication and Civic Participation (Shah et al., 2005, p.538). 
While the above mentioned studies have shown that those connected to online media have 
increased political participation rates, some authors are more reticent to link the two. Rather than 
a mobilising force, some scholars have argued online media simply extend motivations in citizens 
who are already predisposed to participative behaviour (Mitchelstein et al., 2020; Norris, 2001). 
Further counter-evidence to the online media participation theory has shown that discussion 
online is not always conductive to participation, as unpleasant or unresponsive encounters can 
discourage and isolate individuals (Anduiza et al., 2012; Lu et al., 2016; McClain, 2021; D. Mutz, 
2006). But disagreement in online discussions can also increase exposure to diverse political views, 
which enhance political cognition (Song & Eveland, 2015). Although these differences in 
observation exist, there is a broad consensus in the literature that online media use (consumption 
and expression) is positively associated to political participation (Lu et al., 2016). This is backed by 
additional meta-analyses that aggregate online media and participation results and overwhelmingly 
find a positive link (Boulianne, 2015; Skoric et al., 2016). 
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Participation effect of online media as an (un)equalising force 
 
The third debate identified in the literature is on the effects of online media as a 
democratising, or equalising force in citizen political participation. The affordability and 
accessibility of the internet (in the global North) fostered the belief that online media would help 
subvert socio-economic inequalities in political participation. This perspective became known as 
the mobilisation hypothesis (Boulianne, 2015; Valenzuela et al., 2016). In contrast, the 
reinforcement hypothesis viewed that online media maintains the same socio-economic 
inequalities as the ones found offline, where low-income individuals are less likely to have access 
to the internet or knowledge on its uses (Gustafsson, 2014). Recent evidence supports the 
reinforcement hypothesis, showing that online media can exacerbate socio-political inequalities 
(education and income) in political engagement (Ahmed et al., 2020). It has long been known that 
education and income are strong predictors of political participation (Almond & Verba, 1963; 
Brady et al., 1995). These results therefore suggest the benefits of online media towards political 
participation are limited. Demographic characteristics such as age, sex, ethnicity and urbanisation 
also influence political knowledge and participation (Ahmed & Cho, 2019), and interestingly, 
online media have been found to bridge the gaps in protest participation in age and sex differences, 
but deepen gaps between political left-right ideologies (more on this in chapter 3) (Oser et al., 2013; 
Valenzuela et al., 2016). Therefore, the effects of online media on citizen participation vary 
depending on environmental differences; in some aspects reducing inequalities, and increasing 
them in others.  
Aside from occasional meta-analyses and cross-national comparisons, most research 
studying the effects of online media on political participation have been carried out in the U.S. To 
contribute to the existing body of research, this study compares online media effects on political 
participation in two regions. To this end, we now review the recent history of political participation 
in Latin America and Europe, and examine the most recent findings of online media effects in 










2.2.1. Latin America 
 
The late twentieth century in Latin America was characterised by transitions from 
authoritarianism to electoral democracy, and an increase in citizen participation in most countries 
(first through voting, then protests). In this subsection, we examine the socio-cultural implications 
of the governmental changes to understand the political climate that preceded the twenty first 
century. The introduction of democratic elections in Latin America started in Argentina in 1973 
(subsequently revoked and re-established in 1983), and spread to most of the region throughout 
the 1970s up to the 1990s. This shift was somewhat unexpected, amid a high level of political 
uncertainty and a somewhat weak civic culture. Although this period is often framed within the 
‘third wave’ of global democratisation (Huntington, 1991), the factors influencing its transition do 
not align with other developing regions (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2013). Few Latin American 
countries saw a decline in political legitimacy or in the economy, many authoritarian governments 
were supported by religious entities, and the influential and financial role of international pressures 
for regime change was ambiguous. Instead, democratisation in the region was principally marked 
by administrative change, rather than a societal or structural change, where elites who had 
previously pursued non-democratic governance, continued to do so within a democratic context 
(Avritzer, 2002, p. 78). 
 The ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s witnessed the implementation of financially unsustainable 
policies that devastated many Latin American countries, throughout the global economic shift 
towards free trade. In this period, civil society and human rights mobilisations, including 
indigenous, women’s and trade union movements, grew as a result of citizen engagement, through 
international communities and activist networks (Bianchi et al., 2016). Although these groups had 
not been an essential part of the democratic transitions, their growth was representative of a shared 
sentiment for the need for social and political participation of the general population. At the time, 
political networks and participation of indigenous people, people of African descent, women and 
students, gained more attention than opposition parties or trade unions, because the latter had 
been banned during the dictatorships (Espinal & Zhao, 2015). In terms of conventional 
participation, the context of the late twentieth century favoured the voices of the elite, white, male 
and wealthy. In an attempt to redistribute political efficacy, a counter-measure that many Latin 
American countries introduced was compulsory voting. 
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The permeation of the events from this period into modern democratic times is recognised 
in the election results of the following decades; specifically, the election of leaders of indigenous 
descent (Victor Hugo Cárdenas, vice-president of Bolivia in 1994, and Evo Morales first elected 
Bolivian president in 2005) and the election of women presidents (Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua, 
1990, Mireya Moscoso in Panama, 1999, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, 2006, Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner in Argentina, 2007, Dilma Rousseff in Brazil 2010, and Laura Chinchilla in Costa Rica, 
2010). A notable structural impact of the implementation of compulsory voting, has been the 
minimal gender differences in turnout in many Latin American countries in the twenty first century. 
 
The 2000s were marked by rapid and intense urbanisation, particularly during the 
commodities boom between 2005 and 2015. The growth of cities promoted greater proportions 
of education and wealth, but also increased feelings of political inefficacy and social distrust 
(Carreras & Bowler, 2019), resulting in a mixed effect on the socio-economic factors in individuals’ 
lives that both promoted and discouraged political participation. This is one of many factors that 
influenced a dip in political interest and participation in Latin America in the 2010s, along with 
frustration with the quality of political institutions, and opposition to economic policies (Carreras 
& Bowler, 2019, p.725). Rising socio-political tensions, and the inability of public institutions to 
attend citizen demands in many countries resulted in a representation crisis. Voter turnout lowered 
in spite of fines in compulsory voting, and citizens no longer identified with party ideologies 
(Valenzuela et al., 2016). The systemic degradation in party system representativeness was 
accompanied by a steady decline in public support for democracy (Latinobarómetro, 2019). 
Most recently, in 2019, several Latin American countries witnessed a surge in protests (Chile, 
Colombia, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guatemala among others), in most cases ignited by new 
policies or legislation (on fuel or transport prices). Although lower than the U.S. and Western 
Europe, internet penetration in Latin America has increased within the last few years, particularly 
in South America, reaching an average regional level of 72% in 2019 (Chevalier, 2020; Navarro, 
2020). As a result, an increased use of online media use to coordinate these protests was noted. 
Valenzuela and colleagues (2016) found that in 17 Latin American countries, social media increased 
chances of protest participation. Masías and colleagues (2018) demonstrated strong evidence for a 
link between online media use and protest patterns in most of the region’s countries, particularly 






Much of Western Europe democratised towards the end of the nineteenth century. The era, 
marked by uncertainty, brought about universal male suffrage, accountability mechanisms for  the 
executive and legislative powers, and the institutionalisation of civil rights (Ziblatt, 2006). Within 
the framework of waves of democratisation, this is considered the first (Huntington, 1991). The 
transition towards new political orders still generally restricted citizen participation, and the 
cementing of democratic systems and the normalisation of participation of citizens in politics 
became more established in the twentieth century. 
In post-war Western Europe, participation remained broadly conventional, with citizens 
expressing political interest through voting, membership in political organisations and parties, and 
communication with political representatives. In the 1960s, the range of political activities 
expanded to violent and non-violent mass gatherings organised by civil society (e.g. trade unions, 
students, women’s groups) (Linssen et al., 2014). The May 1968 protests, sparked in Paris, then 
spreading to other cities in the region, defined a new generation of adult voters, whose political 
interests no longer prioritised economic and physical safety, but idealised individual freedom of 
choice (including topics such as sexual and reproductive rights, and immigration and racial rights) 
(Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Soon after, Portugal (1974), Greece (1974) and Spain (1976) were the 
last countries to democratise in Western Europe, and according to Diamond and Linz (1989, p. ix) 
“the toppling of Western Europe’s last three dictatorships, then moved on through Latin America”.  
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) experienced democratisation after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Like certain Latin American states, the construction of social, economic and technocratic 
ties with the U.S. and Western Europe at the end of the Cold War resulted in incumbents ceding 
power rather than cracking down on citizens’ unconventional participation. At the turn of the 
decade, many CEE countries held democratic elections for the first time since the late 1930s. 
Munck and Leff (1997) find similarities in the democratic transitions of CEE and Latin America, 
where some countries experienced a political rupture, via popular demonstrations 
(Czechoslovakia), military defeat (Argentina), or extrication (Hungary), while others underwent a 
slow transition due to a disintegrating party system with a strong elite that either negotiated their 
retreat (Brazil, Poland) or conceded through a plebiscite (Chile). Another similarity between CEE 
and Latin America was high election turnout right after the establishment of democracy. Yet, in 
CEE, citizen disenchantment followed much faster than in Latin America, as the political elite 
struggled to form representative and coherent narratives for the mass public, and political 
‘outsiders’ struggled to form a popular opposition. Towards the end of the 1990s, voter turnout 
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declined in both regions (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007, p. 13). Citizen withdrawal from 
conventional and unconventional channels of political participation affected much of the 
European region until the early 2000s (Linssen et al., 2014). 
In line with grievances theory, the shock of the 2008 financial crisis on rising precarity and 
unemployment throughout Europe was followed by a rise in unconventional participation, namely 
protests (Kern et al., 2015). At the same time, Western Europe saw an increasing presence of 
parties and political groups online, attempting to appear more approachable, particularly during 
electoral campaigns (Barboni & Treille, 2010, p. 1138; Cantijoch, 2012). Scholarship on the effects 
of online media on political participation in Western Europe has mostly been inspired by studies 
developed in North America (Cantijoch, 2012; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Holt et al., 2013; Lilleker 
& Koc-Michalska, 2017; Lu et al., 2016; Shah et al., 2005; Vissers & Stolle, 2014). In a comparative 
survey study, Vaccari and Valeriani (2018) show that citizens from both ‘established’ and ‘third 
wave’ Western European democracies exchange political information and discussion online, 
activities which are positively associated to political participation (showing a higher link in 
‘established’ democracies). Research on the effects of online media on participation in CEE is 
limited (for exceptions, see Placek, 2017; Surowiec & Štětka, 2017). Access and use of online media 
platforms is less prevalent in the subregion, where socio-economic differences in internet use are 
more pronounced (Petrjánošová, 2014; van Dijk, 2008) and its political usage by citizens less 
investigated. Only about 50% of the region are regular internet users (Surowiec & Štětka, 2017). 
Existing studies have focused on examining politicians’ use of online networks to diffuse messages 
rather than looking at citizens’ political information seeking or discussions online. Limited 
freedom of press continues to affect the organisation of unconventional participation (Knott, 
2018), although there have been some signs of online coordination of protests such as the 2014 
EuroMaidan protests in Kyiv, Ukraine (Onuch, 2015). 
 
The evolution and maturity of democracy and citizen participation in Latin America and 
Europe are at different stages of maturity, but even within Europe there is a clear distinction 
between the Western European and CEE experiences of the effects of online media on 
participation. Latin America and Europe share democratic values that promote the engagement 
and participative behaviours of citizens, yet the challenges populations face are somewhat distinct. 
While in Latin America and CEE, the reach of internet access has not made the political 
participation benefits accessible to the general public, Western Europe faces the challenge of socio-
economic stratification effects on political information and interaction online, which handicap the 
less educated and lower-income groups. These technological and socio-political differences 
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between the regions suggest that the relational use of online media for political purposes might be 
more stable in Western Europe than Latin America and CEE. Nonetheless, the drop in political 
participation in both regions during the 2010s, and its resurgence with the spread of online media 
usage in both regions, implies how the new technology may be similarly enabling the re-
engagement of citizenry in countries at different stages of democracy.  
Considering these cross-regional reflections and the review of the literature on political 
participation, we put forward our research hypotheses on the effects of citizens’ online media use 




The first two hypotheses will be guided by the reported differences in effects of online media 
information consumption and political expression, on citizen political participation. This 
distinction is most clearly identified by Boulianne’s (2017) meta-analysis that detects that empirical 
studies with higher coefficients are those related to political expression on social media and political 
participation, over those of information consumption. Therefore, our hypotheses are: 
 
H1. Online political consumption and participation hypothesis: online political consumption is 
weakly related to offline political participation.  
H2. Online political expression and participation hypothesis: online political expression is strongly 
associated to offline political participation. 
 
In the same meta-analysis, Boulianne (2017) finds that online political consumption effects 
on participation are more likely to be significant in systems with limited civil liberties. Other 
contextual differences such as level of democratic maturity are expected to influence cross-country 
and cross-regional results. Our cross-regional hypothesis is:  
 
H3a. Cross-regional comparison hypothesis: the effects of online political behaviours on 
participation are detected in both regions, with a stronger link in Europe than Latin America due 
to its higher levels of democratic maturity and internet connectivity (with the exception of more 
recently democratic CEE states).  
 
The second part of the cross-regional comparison hypothesis (H3b) is addressed in the 
next chapter.  
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3. Ideological extremism  
 
3.1. Theory  
 
3.1.1. Ideological self-placement, fragmentation and polarisation 
 
The measurement of an individual’s political ideology and preferences has been subject of 
debate, the main issue being, placing them in relation to one another to derive coherent 
conclusions (Jost et al., 2009). One method of measurement is surveying self-placement on a 
spectrum. This measure functions as a categorical ruler that places individuals (or parties) in one 
or several axes. The most common unidimensional spectrum of ideologies is spread from ‘left’ to 
‘right’. The terminology stems from the seating arrangements of the French parliament after the 
revolution (commoners on the left, aristocrats on the right) (Heywood, 2017). Today, the left is 
broadly associated with socialist ideology and policies, and the right with conservatism. A middle 
stance that moderately promotes ideologies from both sides is labelled ‘centrist’ or moderate. The 
measurement and analysis of ideological self-placement on unidimensional scales has been 
criticised as reductionist (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). Evidence for this critique is highlighted by 
studies that show variation in self-categorisation depending on education (Carroll & Kubo, 2018; 
Zechmeister & Corral, 2013) and cultural background (Bauer et al., 2017). This occurs because of 
individual differences in understanding the ideologies posited in the spectrum and in self-
awareness of one’s own political identity. Although the notions of ideological left and right do not 
translate seamlessly across countries, let alone regions, cross-cultural research continues to use 
similar reference points. For example, the widely recognised World Values Survey maps socio-
political attitudes using a two-factor ideology system of secularism and traditionalism. This is 
because political behaviour research employs ideological positioning scales to identify trends in 
beliefs, not specific ideologies. Simplifying political preferences along one dimension not only 
facilitates comparative analysis for research, but also decomplexifies ideological identities for 
citizens, who use these dimensions to guide their political affiliations (Kitschelt et al., 2010; 
Wojcieszak & Rojas, 2011).  
 
Ideological self-positioning on a unidimensional spectrum is typically normally distributed, 
with a majority of populations identifying at the centre-left and centre-right (Rodon, 2015). 
However, the distribution of self-placement can evolve and change, depending on the number of 
parties that represent different positions along the spectrum and dividing policy issues of the 
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moment. These changes can be understood in terms of fragmentation and polarisation. Here, we 
define fragmentation as the process by which audiences become more dotted along the political 
spectrum, divided into smaller factions, facilitated by party-system structure and new media 
content specialisation. And we define polarisation as a solidification of ideological conflicts in a 
society, which stress and widen divisions in opinion (Hinich & Munger, 1996; Tewksbury & 
Rittenberg, 2012). Both terms are used to understand citizen ideological self-placement, as they 
represent trends in political knowledge and identification within a population. In the next 
subsection, we focus our attention on individuals who place themselves on the opposite ends of 
the political spectrum, the extremes. 
 
3.1.2. Extremism and populism  
 
The end of the 2010s saw a global rise in extremist and populist electoral successes, including 
in Europe and Latin America (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This trend gained considerable academic 
attention (among them: Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2020; Postill, 2018; Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 2017; 
Sullet-Nylander et al., 2019). Before reviewing this research, a distinction between extremism and 
populism must be made. 
Extremism denotes ideological placement at the poles of the spectrum. It is often associated 
with anti-democratic tendencies even though parties typically follow electoral rules (Akkerman & 
Rooduijn, 2015). A rise in support for extremist parties reflects a population’s reaction to a critical 
juncture in the socio-political system, in the absence of a moderate party representing citizen 
demands (Akkerman & Rooduijn, 2015; Kitschelt, 1994). Citizen ideological extremism in these 
studies is either measured through support of extremist parties (de Lange & Mudde, 2005; Marcos-
Marne et al., 2021; Schkade et al., 2010), or using ideological self-placement, where individuals 
identifying with the extremes of the scale are categorised as such (J. K. Lee et al., 2014; Stroud, 
2010; Wojcieszak & Rojas, 2011). 
In comparison to extremism, the definition of populism is more disputed, and has been 
described as ranging from types of ideology, strategy and communication style (Rooduijn & 
Akkerman, 2017). Cas Mudde (2004) defines populist ideology as a loose set of ideas with three 
core features. The first is an anti-establishment antagonistic position, between the ‘good’ people 
versus the ‘bad’ elite. The second is an authoritarian and charismatic leadership. And the third, is 
a nativist penchant for homogeneous culturalism, nationalistic protectionism, and nostalgia for 
past glories. But this definition does not link populist parties by ideological positioning in any way. 
An alternative interpretation is that populism is a communicative style, understood using framing 
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theory, where it is the antagonistic, charismatic and nativist campaign discourse that has led to a 
rise in populist candidates (Aslanidis, 2016). This perspective explains how parties from different 
ideological stances can be grouped together under an umbrella term.  
 
Therefore, extremism and populism are distinct, one is assigned to ideologies at the extremes 
of the spectrum, the other uses discourse to garner popular support. They are also similar, where 
extremist candidates often use populist rhetoric (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017), and populist 
candidates and parties often place themselves on the ideological extreme left or right (Norris & 
Inglehart, 2019). Individuals who identify with either the extreme left or right also generally display 
stronger populist attitudes (Marcos-Marne et al., 2021). Another noticeable overlap between 
extremism and populism, discussed in the next subsection, is the observation that candidates of 
both affinities have taken advantage of online media to bolster their communication strategies 
(Almeida & Pismel, 2019; Boulianne et al., 2020a; Postill, 2018). Before reviewing this, we look at 
scholarly evidence for the influence of media on political ideology. 
 
3.1.3. Ideology and extremism in a digital age 
 
The study of mass media influences on citizens’ political ideology is based on the theory that 
media outlets have ‘agenda setting’ power. According to agenda setting theory, selection and 
framing of news stories gives news media companies the power to disseminate information with 
a political bias, thus facilitating the creation of political affiliations between news suppliers and 
political parties (Hoewe & Peacock, 2020). However, rising news dissemination on online media 
has distorted agenda setting theory, as it promotes a high-choice environment tailored for 
consumer interest (López-López et al., 2020, p. 1876). By using online media, individuals have 
gained increased levels of discretion over the type of news they consume, while also obtaining the 
opportunity to react to news content and interact with other news consumers (Liang & Nordin, 
2012).  
Prior to the 2000s, the traditional media environment consisted in competition over 
increasing viewership of the median consumer, thus encouraging more moderate opinions to be 
broadcast, and creating a relatively homogenous news media system (Hoewe & Peacock, 2020). 
Online media increased the supply of ideologically diverse information, which increased 
competition for consumers’ attention between news suppliers. This shift in the market pushed 
traditional media to create online channels of diffusion and also to increase coverage of ideologies 
(Aalberg & de Vreese, 2016). As a result, the increase in contact with ideologically alternative 
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currents online has been connected to the rise in extremism (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007, p. 12). 
We review findings in the literature on the effects of online media on ideological extremism in 
three parts, by looking at online media effects: as information tools, as communicative tools, and 
on polarisation. 
 
Ideological effect of online media as informational tools 
 
Research on the effects of citizens’ information seeking use on online media supports the 
premise that online news incites a more fragmented and polarised political environment than 
offline news consumption (Fletcher et al., 2020; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011). But the widening of 
the gap in political ideologies and increasing dissimilarities in perceived attributes between groups 
within the mass public does not automatically mean an accumulation of public opinion at the poles 
of the spectrum (Enders & Armaly, 2019; Esteban & Ray, 1994). 
Approaches in literature on the effects of online media on citizen ideology are dual: either 
they focus on individual behaviour patterns, or they concentrate on the structural environment of 
online platforms. The ‘selective exposure’ argument, based on Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive 
dissonance (Nie et al., 2010), posits that people tend to avoid information that conflicts with their 
own opinions in favour of self-reinforcing messages. Thus, the behaviour of seeking “attitude-
consistent information” (Valenzuela et al., 2019, p. 806) reduces individuals’ range of viewpoints 
and unwittingly polarises them along ideological lines (Warner, 2010), a process also known as 
‘confirmation bias’ (Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012). Selective exposure behaviour has 
been shown to increase in individuals with extremist attitudes (Stroud, 2010). The ‘personalised 
content’ (Sunstein, 2018) or ‘filter bubbles’ (Dutton et al., 2017) argument suspects the structure 
of online media to automatically provide users with related attitude-consistent information, to 
increase further readership. 
Information online is not only produced by the press, but personal and political 
contributions, notably by politicians and populist candidates, are also widely available (Gerbaudo, 
2018). The algorithmic mechanism of virality, the exponential probability that a post or website 
will gain attention as the number of followers or shares increases, has been linked to extremist 
content. This is due to the direct, outrageous and emotional messages, employed by its partisans 
(Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2020). Hyperpartisan news, a press that favours populist candidates (Rae, 
2021), benefits from virality to spread ideologies, because its untraditional journalistic style and 
emotion-provoking content generates more views and reactions than investigative or moderate 
news (Hoewe & Peacock, 2020; Knobloch-Westerwick & Johnson, 2014).  
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Ideological effect of online media as communicative tools 
 
Previous findings on the effects of communicating through online media on citizens’ 
ideology are mixed. The main disagreement in the literature being on whether discussion with 
homogenous or heterogenous networks increases ideological extremism. The first theory, we call 
it the selective discussion hypothesis, argues that online hubs attract like-minded people 
(Valenzuela et al., 2016), and facilitate the formation of ‘deliberative enclaves’, where discussion 
between individuals with homogenous opinions develops (Sunstein, 2007). These hubs have 
earned the label ‘echo chambers’. According to Mutz (2006), the best environment to cultivate 
political activism is one where people are surrounded by those who agree with them, share their 
enthusiasm and share plans for political action. Simultaneously, “when those of like mind come 
together, the feared outcome is polarisation” (D. Mutz, 2006, p. 13). Findings in the literature have 
generally found a link between echo chambers, polarisation and extremism. Quattrociocchi and 
colleagues (2016) show empirical evidence from Italy and the U.S. using platform data extraction, 
that the use of social media promotes selective exposure and echo chambers in individuals, which 
leads to polarisation between groups. In a 23 cross-country study, Bright (2017) demonstrates that 
individuals join online groups according to their ideological preferences, and that the ‘echo 
chamber’ effect of homogenous networking is strongest in ideological extremist groups. 
Wojcieszak (2010) found that not only did extremism increase with online discussion, but also that 
homogenous networks online and heterogenous networks offline most exacerbated extremist 
tendencies. In a panel study measuring political views of individuals over four years, C. Lee and 
colleagues (2018) show that the positive and significant effect of online media on ideological 
extremism is mediated through increased offline political participation. In contrast to these results, 
other scholars have found a weak or inexistent relation between online media use and extremism. 
Based on Swedish survey data from 2002 to 2007, Liang and Nordin (2012) show that internet 
access increases ideological polarisation, but only slightly increases right-wing extremism. In a 
comparative survey study of France, the U.K. and the U.S., Boulianne and colleagues (2020a) do 
not find evidence that online media relates to right-wing populism support (although they measure 
populism, the candidates and parties they refer to are right-wing extremists). Therefore, according 
to the selective exposure hypothesis, there is potentially a relation between online media discussion 
in homogenous networks and ideological extremism, but the above-mentioned mixed results 
strongly invite further investigation.  
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The second theory of online communication effects on citizen ideology relates to the effects 
of heterogenous networks, we call it the disagreement exposure hypothesis. Disagreement 
exposure scholars have suggested that online media do not enclose individuals into echo chambers, 
but rather enable users to encounter a diversity of opinions, and thus are more likely to moderate 
their political positions (Papacharissi, 2002). This counter-argument posits that, on the whole, 
most individuals who use online media have heterogeneous networks of social connections and 
are likely, on average, to also come across attitude inconsistent content (Papacharissi, 2010). Using a 
national U.S. survey, J. K. Lee and colleagues (2014) found that online media use increases 
individuals’ social networks and reduces the echo chamber effect, particularly in individuals who 
seek political information. In a data-mining study of ideological positioning of Twitter users from 
Germany, Spain and the U.S., Barberá (2015) estimates that the ideologically diverse personal 
networks of individuals increase ideology centrism. Drawing on a national U.S. study, Wojcieszak 
and Mutz (2009) demonstrate that discussion between individuals with opposing ideologies occurs 
in online groups by incident, where political discussion is not the group’s central purpose. The 
authors argue that even though individuals tend to seek out online experiences consistent with 
their own opinions (in line with the selective discussion hypothesis), they are still likely to 
encounter political differences. However, a number of studies dispute the moderating effects of 
the disagreement exposure hypothesis, finding that heterogenous networks have also been linked 
to increased polarisation and extremism. In a study of self-reported ideological views in the U.S., 
Schkade and colleagues (2010) found that left-wing and right-wing partisans both showed more 
extremist positioning after deliberating offline with individuals of opposing views. Similarly, in J. 
K. Lee and colleagues’ (2014) previously mentioned survey that showed reduced online echo 
chamber effects in heterogenous networks, the authors also found a relation between network 
heterogeneity and increased polarisation, mediated through the frequency of discussing politics 
with opposition-minded individuals. 
 
There is a general lack of consensus on the overall state of ideological patterns in the online 
public sphere. This is probably because of the high variability in political behaviour depending on 
the network (homogenous or heterogenous) and tools available. Indeed, Conover and colleagues 
(2011) find that depending on the mode of interaction of Twitter, individuals are either very 
polarised (in the retweet function) or very opposition-tolerant (user-to-user mentions). Similarly, 
Wojcieszak and Rojas (2011) demonstrate that general internet use is negatively linked to 
extremism but that seeking entertainment online is positively linked to extremism. Cultural factors 
also seem to influence effects of online media on ideology. In a cross-countries comparison, 
Fletcher and colleagues (2020) find varying levels of polarisation online, with highest proportions 
 39 
in the U.S. and Western Europe, compared to newer democracies (Fletcher et al., 2020). Thus, the 
relation between online media and citizen ideology depends on the predispositions of the 
individual, the online tool being used, and country-level factors (C. Lee et al., 2018). In Figure 2 
below, we schematise the detected patterns of citizen ideology and online media political 
consumption and expression according to the literature. 
 
 
Figure 2. Diagram of Online Media Use and Citizen Ideology, via Political Consumption and 
Expression (author’s elaboration, multiple sources). 
Country-level differences between online media use and extremism are moderated by 
macro-social, political and economic factors. Limited civil liberties also make the relationship more 
difficult to study, where an increased censorship makes citizens less likely to express political views 
(Vergne, 2011). Differences may also arise given individuals’ or parties’ perceived utility of online 
media. The effects of selective exposure, and expression in homogenous or heterogenous 
networks will therefore vary depending on context. As can be observed from the literature review, 
most research on the influence of online media on extremism has been carried out in the U.S. or 
Western Europe, further justifying the regional comparative analysis our research proposes. Given 
the complex relations between online spheres and ideological inclination, we replicate the design 
approach from political participation studies to examine trends in citizen ideological extremism in 
relation to online political consumption and expression. In the following section, we examine and 






















Mirroring the contextualisation in chapter 2, we review recent histories of ideological 
placement, extremism and the rise of online media use in our regions of interest, in order to 
propose informed hypotheses. 
 
3.2.1. Latin America 
 
The political cleavage between the ideologies of liberals and conservatives after the wars of 
independence in Latin America in the nineteenth century created dividing lines in the region’s 
political societies. In many countries, ideological violence between the governing elite was 
temporarily pacified through mass suffrage. In the twentieth century, military dictatorships took 
over from the bureaucratic and authoritarian developmentalist regimes of the 1930s to the 1950s, 
in the midst of an escalating Cold War. Radical politics seemed to reappear during the democratic 
transitions in the 1980s and 1990s, after a string of populist candidates who campaigned for social 
change won presidential elections (e.g. Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Carlos Menem in Argentina). 
But these executives soon switched to align with the internationally-vetted ideologically 
mainstream neoliberal models, against their constituents expectations (Kitschelt et al., 2010, p. 
229). As a result, a dealignment between Latin American electorate ideologies and government 
representation grew.  Towards the end of the twentieth century, left-wing civil society and political 
parties began to successfully organise, and gain support. This shift had a polarising effect on party-
systems (Bornschier, 2019, p.2), and offered citizens a wider range of ideological options to choose 
from. Latinoamericanist political historians Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013, p. 34) explain that 
public opinion and engagement was an important factor in the transition  out of the authoritarian 
regimes of the past century, principally because it emboldened the organisation of opposition 
actors (who participated in elections once permitted). The democratic transitions out of 
authoritarian regimes gave rise to a volatile and fast-changing party-system, which varied 
considerably from country to country, influenced citizens’ general understanding of ideological 
placement in distinct ways, and “can be described only in imprecise terms”(Coppedge, 1998, p. 
547).  
The origins of ideological dimensions and political identification of individuals and parties 
on the left-right spectrum in Latin America are, as a result, complex to analyse.  In their seminal 
book on Latin American party-systems, Kitschelt and colleagues (2010) systematically review and 
compare the historical context and structuration of parties across 12 countries. Although their 
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findings indicate that the level of repression from past authoritarianism and the economic policies 
of the 1990s did not have long-term effects on ideological placement in the region, the wave of 
democratic transitions did lead to short-term ideology placement volatility. As a result, the 
ideological meaning assigned to parties across the left-right spectrum has led to differences in 
political distribution in Latin American countries, in some cases veering more towards the right 
(Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Peru) and other cases leaning more towards the left (Uruguay, Argentina, 
Brazil). Besides this distinction, Kitschelt and colleagues (2010) find that party cleavages across the 
region follow a similar pattern around three issue areas: economic distribution, political regime, 
and religion. Alternate party cleavages in each country are short-lived, and still tend to evolve 
around these three issues. Similar to CEE, party volatility in many Latin American countries has 
meant that electorates are less likely to have long-term party attachments, and thus have more 
difficulty in ideological self-placement (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007, p. 13). 
 
During the twenty first century, moderate and extreme left-wing parties were elected in 
several Latin American countries (Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
Ecuador). This period was named the pink tide, and coincided with considerable economic growth 
due to the boom of the commodities which became briefly associated to the success of the left-
wing (Cachanosky & Padilla, 2020). The rise of the left to executive mandates was facilitated by 
increased party polarisation and stabilisation (Béjar et al., 2020; Handlin, 2018). Left-wing electoral 
candidates represented voters’ discontent with past neoliberal economic policies, and opposed the 
right-wing who had mostly been in power during the 1990s. More recently, the economic-
distribution has issue again has divided the electorate, due to a crisis of representation on the left, 
resulting from the dissatisfactory management of anti-cyclical policies during the late 2010s 
(Bianchi et al., 2016). Tenuous election campaigns swept the region, mired by corruption scandals 
and political distrust. In some cases, citizens elected populist non-mainstream candidates (Brazil, 
Mexico, El Salvador), and in other cases voters returned to supporting right-wing parties after 
disenchantment  with the left-wing (Chile, Uruguay). The increased use, particularly by populist 
candidates, of online media during these campaigns, mainly Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp, 
and particularly in populist candidates, was noted by political communication scholars (Waisbord 
& Amado, 2017). The link to online media was arguably encouraged by the mono- or duopolistic 
traditional media structures that have strong ties with mainstream parties in most Latin American 
countries. In an analysis of citizens’ reactions to politicians’ messages on Twitter in five Latin 
American countries, López-López and colleagues (2020) identified strongly polarised left and 
right-wing currents, promoted by the use of emotional language. The spread of extremism in Latin 
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American online publics has also been reported, particularly in the Brazilian right-wing 
(Mitchelstein et al., 2020). Although ideological polarisation and rising extremism in Latin America 
has been identified in online spaces, scholars do not label it a technological phenomenon, but 
rather a result of social critical juncture and political discontent (Valenzuela et al., 2019; Zuluaga 




After the Second World War, the extreme right was largely marginalised in European society, 
because of its association to the Holocaust, and the extreme left ruled in Eastern Europe under 
the Soviet Union (Betz, 1999). On occasion, short waves of extemism occurred in Western Europe. 
For example, in the 1950s, France saw the rise and fall of Poujadism, an anti-corporatist and 
nativist trade union movement, and in the 1960s, Germany witnessed the short-lived event of the 
National Democratic Party. However, since the late 1980s, a more stable emergence of right-wing 
extremist parties and movements spread across the region; while the extreme left reinvented itself 
away from Marxism-Leninism, and has been exploited by other groups such as environmentalists, 
feminists, and libertarians (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). One of the key factors for this rise has 
been growing political disenchantment and the decline in trust, engagement, and support for 
democratic institutions and parties, also known as a “democratic deficit” (Bartlett, 2014, p. 102). 
This sentiment was arguably triggered by a spreading belief of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalisation 
in Western European society. This social shift instilled a transformation in party systems at the 
turn of the millenium, where cultural issues such as mass immigration and resistance against 
European integration were included into extremist party rhetoric (Kriesi et al., 2008). The level of 
extremism in the discourse and ideological placement of these parties has varied (Aslanidis, 2016). 
Yet, populist and extreme right literature has tended to group these parties together into the ‘new 
populist right’ category, and has largely been comparatively studied as a Western European 
phenomenon (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK) 
(see Kriesi et al., 2008). Following the 2008 Great Recession, the winner versus losers of 
globalisation argument gained further attention, as rising unemployment accelerated the decline in 
positive political attitudes and voter turnout (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). The economic crisis was 
linked to the increase in support for anti-establishment parties (such as the Front National in 
France, the British National Party and UKIP in the UK, Syriza in Greece, Moviemento 5 Stelle in 
Italy, and the Freedom party in the Netherlands, among others) and a fall in trust of European 
political institutions (Algan et al., 2017). The 2014 immigration crisis further fuelled the rise in 
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Western European right-wing extremism, strengthened a pan-European alliance, and gained 
considerable political weight in national parliaments of Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Latvia, as well as the European Parliament in the 2010s 
(Norris & Inglehart, 2019). 
In CEE, extremism in its democratic regimes has been generally understudied, and research 
has largely focused on communist successor parties (with the exception of Poland and Romania 
with stronger currents of right-wing extremism) (de Lange & Mudde, 2005). This is perhaps due 
to a less clearly defined stratification of parties along the ideological spectrum following 
democratisation, where “the legacy of the hegemonic communist party system hindered the 
development and institutionalisation of ideologically differentiated and electorally distinctive 
political parties” (Stanley, 2017, p. 189), similarly to Latin America (Kitschelt et al., 2010). The 
stigma of radicalism was also more closely linked to a fear of the return of demagoguery. Reduced 
to small gatherings in the 1990s (Mudde, 2005), right-wing extremist groups increasingly began to 
organise in the 2000s, in response to the liberal reforms of the post-communist transition and 
inspired by the Western European new populist right. This trend additionally revived ‘unresolved’ 
ethnic racist and historic rivalries (Stanley, 2017). The electoral success of extremist fringe parties 
has varied across CEE, from limited success (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) to obtaining 
seats in parliament (Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and even establishing 
themselves as important political actors (Romania). 
The link between the populist extreme right and utility given to online media is more 
extensively studied in Western Europe than in Latin America (Boulianne et al., 2020a; Stanley, 
2017). Indeed, right-wing extremist politicians have frequently articulated their ideologies and 
criticism of political institutions on Facebook and Twitter to gain electoral support (Engesser et 
al., 2017). Research in the previous subsection has pointed towards polarising and extremist-
reinforcing effects of online media on Western European citizens, and has encouraged the debate 
that online media have facilitated the growth of ideologically extreme political behaviour in the 
region (An et al., 2014).  
 
What is clear from the contextualisation in our two regions of interest, is that a decline in 
political engagement and trust provoked by economic and cultural transformation at the turn of 
the twenty first century has given rise to a readjustment in political party-system competition, in 
which a rise in the success of populist and extremist electoral candidates has occurred in both 
regions. At the same time, increased use of online media has led to the digitisation of political 
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behaviour of parties and citizens, and facilitated the spread of ideas as well as the polarisation of 




Using the same approach as with political participation, we theorise on the potential relation 
between online media use and ideological extremism in Latin America and Europe. In accordance 
with our review of previous findings on the effects of online information seeking and selective 
exposure, and online exchanges within homogeneous and heterogenous networks, on citizens’ 
propensity towards ideological extremism, we hypothesise the following:  
 
H4. Online political consumption and extremism hypothesis: individuals who see political content 
online identify somewhat more towards the left and right political extremes.  
H5. Online political expression and extremism hypothesis: individuals who post or share political 
content online position themselves much further along the left and right political extremes. 
 
Country and regional-level differences are expected due to context-specific historical and 
political variation. Specifically, the link between right-wing extremism in Western Europe with 
citizens’ online media use has been more reported than in Latin America or Eastern Europe. 
Therefore, we expect that: 
 
H3b. Cross-regional comparison hypothesis: the effects of online political behaviours on 
ideological extremism appear in both regions, with a stronger link in Europe than Latin America 





First, the dataset on which our study is drawn will be presented, followed by a description 
of the key variables and controls. The descriptive statistics of these variables will provide an outline 




The data used for this study are sourced from the AmericasBarometer survey from 2018/19 
and the European Social Survey (ESS9) from approximately the same time period (2018/20). The 
AmericasBarometer survey is carried out biennially by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. It is the only survey that has thirty years of experience in 
rigorous social comparison between 34 nations of North, Central and South America. The ESS is 
a cross-national academically-driven survey with 20 years of experience of collecting socio-political 
data in Europe. Both provide openly accessible datasets online as well as numerous manuals and 
complementary materials for analysis2. Aside from being the largest social surveys in each region, 
both surveys are regularly cited in the literature and used for policy assessment and development3. 
This widespread recognition increases their reliability. 
 
Both the AmericasBarometer and ESS are carried out by local institutions in each country, 
and use a multistage probability sampling design. In our 2018/19 datasets, face-to-face surveys 
were conducted at respondents’ homes, and included adults above the age of 15 in Europe and 16 
or 18 in Latin America depending on the country’s voting age. The questionnaires used a set 
standard selection of questions, and were conducted either in Spanish or English in Latin America, 
and in the each country’s language in Europe. Further information on the surveys’ methodologies 
can be found on their corresponding websites (https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/; 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/)4. 
 
The surveys provide rich data on respondents’ socioeconomic situation and political opinion, 
but more importantly, these regional surveys were selected because they introduced questions on 
 
2 LAPOP dataset: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/raw-data.php 
  ESS dataset: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/ 
3 LAPOP list of publications: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/references.php 
  ESS list of publications: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/findings/bibliography.html 
4 LAPOP and ESS both provide technical information to apply the appropriate weighting to the samples analysed, 
which allows nationally representative estimates. 
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politically motivated online activity in recent rounds (in 20125 and 2016 respectively). Similarities 
in question and answer structures of our variables of interest in AmericasBarometer and ESS, 
notably those that relate to political participation, ideological positioning, and online political 
activity, additionally provide us with the opportunity to develop region-wide analyses and to 




The data contain in their raw forms N = 28,042 observations for 18 Latin American 
countries in the AmericasBarometer survey (Central and South America, and the Caribbean; Mean 
Responses per Country = 1,558), and N = 49,519 observations for 29 European countries in the 
ESS (Mean Responses per Country = 1,708). The countries that are included in the analyses, along 
with the year they were surveyed are detailed in Table 1. The sum of countries is believed to be 
sufficient to represent observable trends in the two regions and to explore relevant cross-regional 
differences. 
 
Table 1. Latin American and European surveyed countries (N = 47) 
Survey Countries surveyed Year Surveyed 
 
LAPOP 2018/19 
Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama 2018 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 




ESS9 2018 ed.3.1 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland,  
United Kingdom 
2018-19 
Croatia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Slovakia, Spain 2019-20 
 
 
5 The LAPOP survey included a question on social media usage in 2012 for the first time, with the question “And in 
the last twelve months, have you read or shared political information through any social network website such as 
Twitter or Facebook or Orkut?”. Social media was not mentioned in the 2014 or 2016/17 rounds. The questions 
that refer to social media in the 2018 survey are distinct and defined in more detail below. 
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The measures used for the analysis of online political activity and its relation with political 
behaviours offline are based on a set of dependent and independent variables.  
 
4.2.1. Dependent variables 
 
Our analysis is divided into two parts, using two key dependent variables. The first 
dependent variable is a set of measures of offline political participation, the second is a scale 
measuring ideological extremism. The two aforementioned surveys include a number of questions 
on respondents’ participation in several political activities, these are considered for the first variable. 
The examined survey questions are listed in Table 2. The correlation between the political 
participation variables is not particularly high (Cronbach a = 0.62 for AmericasBarometer, 
Cronbach a = 0.45 for ESS).  Therefore, we look at each activity as individual binary variables 
(following Espinal & Zhao, 2015), where participating in the activity is coded as (1) and not 
participating as (0). Due to the exploratory nature of this study and the fact that it is a common 
approach in the literature, we also aggregate the responses to create an index of participative action 
for each survey, and examine whether potential relations identified in the individual dependent 
variables still hold when combined. 
 
Table 2. Political participation dependent variables. 
Variable AmericasBarometer European Social Survey 
1. Voted Did you vote in the last presidential 
elections of (year of last presidential 
elections)? 
Did you vote in the last [country] 
national election in [month/year]? 
2. Protested In the last 12 months, have you 
participated in a demonstration or 
protest march? 
During the last 12 months, have you  




Have you attended a town meeting, city 
council meeting or other meeting in the 
past 12 months? 
During the last 12 months, have you  
contacted a politician, government or 
local government official?  
4. Political 
institution 
[Do] you attend meetings of a political 
organisation? 
During the last 12 months, have you  





[Do] you attend meetings of a 
community improvement committee or 
association? 
During the last 12 months, have you 
worked in another organisation or 
association?6 
6. Badge N/A During the last 12 months, have you 
worn or displayed a campaign 
badge/sticker? 
7. Petition N/A During the last 12 months, have you 
signed a petition? 
 
The participation variable of attending or working in an association for community problem-
solving or improvement invokes civic rather than political participation, but is included in the list 
of activities because it is considered a civic skill directly applicable to politics (Espinal & Zhao, 
2015, p. 126). 
 
The second dependent variable is a measure of ideological extremism on the left-right 
spectrum. Used to gauge political trends, respondents are asked where they position themselves 
on a numeric scale from small numbers on the left, to higher numbers on the right, to represent 
the ideological left and right on the political spectrum (in AmericasBarometer from 1-10 and ESS 
from 0-10). The choice of selecting ideological preference on the one-dimensional left-right 
spectrum as a measure is limiting (Bauer et al., 2017), and a better alternative may have been to 
analyse respondent’s party-affiliation (Boulianne et al., 2020a). However, it would be difficult to 
compare across 47 countries, and arguably, would end up being equally reductive. The left-right 
scale has been reported as a reliable representation of broad ideological trends (Carroll & Kubo, 
2018), which is what we seek to measure. 
 
Following a similar method to Lee and colleagues (2014) and Wojcieszak and Rojas (2011), 
we recode the ideological extremism measure into a scale of absolute distance from the centre-
most position (which is coded as 0). For AmericasBarometer, the centre-most values from the 
original scale are (5) and (6), and for ESS the centre-most value is (5). This means that the values 
(4) and (7) from AmericasBarometer are recoded as (1), and the values (3) and (8) are recoded as 
(2), and so on. The scale for AmericasBarometer ranges from (0) to represent moderate ideology 
to (4) for extremist ideology, and the ESS scale ranges from (0) to (5). 
 
6 The full question begins with: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent 
things from going wrong”. This activity has been classified as ‘civic participation’ and as ‘social capital’ rather than 
‘political participation’ in previous literature (Carreras & Bowler, 2019; Espinal & Zhao, 2015). 
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4.2.2. Independent variables 
 
Having established the degree that people participate politically and their self-reported 
political ideology, we can now test our hypotheses on the extent of effects on these behaviours. 
To complete the analysis, we create our key independent variable: online political activity. 
Differences in the syntax of questions in our two regional surveys entail an important distinction. 
In Latin America, the question enquires on the individual’s viewing of political content on social 
media, and in Europe, the question asks whether the individual has shared political content online. 
While the first is related to consumption of political content, which can be either intentional or 
accidental, the second is an act of political expression and is intentionally sought. Responses to 
both questions provide additional complexity to our analysis and will inform our hypotheses on 
online political consumption and expression. 
 
In the AmericasBarometer questionnaire, respondents are asked how often they see political 
content on three social media platforms: Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. Responses are 
recoded into a binary variable, where seeing political content on any platform was coded as (1), 
and never seeing political content on social media was coded (0) (“Don’t know”, “No answer” 
and “Inapplicable” were treated as missing values). Multiple imputation was applied to the missing 
values for the social media binary variable (9,001 values imputed), to simulate the values generated 
for individuals who do not own a social media account, and for individuals who did not report 
their ideological positions on the extremism scale7 (4,161 values imputed). We computed 10 sets 
of imputed values using ordered logistic regression on these two variables. The variables used to 
build the imputation model were: age, gender, internet connectivity, number of individuals in the 
household, urbanisation and country. Multiple imputation assumes that data is missing at random 
(Lodder, 2014). Although the AmericasBarometer survey sample design promotes randomised and 
representative selection of respondents, it is likely that there are unobserved biases explaining the 
differences between those with a social media account and those without one. To minimise this 
bias, imputation was only applied to the online political activity and ideological extremism scale 
variables, and thus does not eliminate all missing observations from the entire dataset. The 
remaining data were analysed using listwise deletion.  
 
 
7 Following Stata and UCLA instructions and recommendations, for full instructions see the following manuals: 
https://www.stata.com/manuals13/mimiimputeologit.pdf; 
https://www.stata.com/manuals13/mimipredict.pdf#mimipredict; 
https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/seminars/mi_in_stata_pt1_new/   
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The ESS questionnaire asked if respondents had posted or shared anything about politics 
online in the last 12 months (such as on blogs, by email or on social media such as Facebook or 
Twitter). The dichotomous answers are coded “Yes” (1) and “No” (0). Unlike the Latin American 
dataset, the missing variables (“Refusal”; “Don’t know”) make up less than one percent, so they 
are not imputed.  
 
4.2.3. Control variables 
 
The relationships between the measures and online political activity in Latin America and 
Europe will be modelled using a series of logistic regression models. The first model estimates the 
relation between the key independent variable, online political consumption (for 
AmericasBarometer), online political expression (for ESS), and the key dependent variables, 
political participation, and ideological extremism. The second model controls for other individual-
level variables associated with political participation and ideological extremism. These are 
described in depth below. Country-level fixed effects are added in the third model, to control for 
variance between countries and ensure the results are not driven by these unobservable differences.  
 
A range of individual-level variables are included to control for factors influencing our 
dependent variables. Demographic (or extrinsic) variables include age, education, sex, internet, 
income and level of urbanisation. Age, measured in years, can either have a positive or negative 
effect on political participation depending on the politically participative activity, for example older 
citizens are more likely to vote but younger citizens are more likely to protest (Espinal & Zhao, 
2015; Melo & Stockemer, 2014). Age has also been found to be a predictor of ideological 
positioning and extremism (Boxell et al., 2017) and is closely related to internet use (Ahmed et al., 
2020; Holt et al., 2013), thus making it likely to interact with our key independent variable, online 
political activity. Education, categorised into three groups of qualifications (primary, secondary and 
post-secondary in AmericasBarometer, and lower, middle and higher in ESS) is both a predictor 
of socialisation that leads to political participation (Mayer, 2011; Persson, 2015) and is a mediator 
of citizens’ ability to understand different ideological positions in their country’s party system 
(Carroll & Kubo, 2018). The dichotomous variable sex, (“Female” coded (2)), predicts differences 
in types of political participation and activism, but is not a predictor of participation (Coffé & 
Bolzendahl, 2010; Espinal & Zhao, 2015). Sex is thought to be a predictor of ideological self-
placement (Norrander & Wilcox, 2008), which is our second dependent variable. Access to the 
internet (binary variable of accessing internet from one’s home) increases the likelihood of interest 
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in politics (Liang & Nordin, 2012) and influences political participation inequality, and deepens 
socioeconomic differences in offline participation (Ahmed et al., 2020). 
 
Other demographic control variables include income, which is measured as a proxy of 
socioeconomic status (for AmericasBarometer we use the 17 point scale of total monthly 
household income, for ESS we use the 10 point scale from low to high household income), and 
level of urbanisation (in AmericasBarometer, categorised into a four point scale and in ESS a five 
point scale, ranging from a “Big city” (1) to the “Countryside” (5)) as observable characteristics 
that co-vary and influence the reported measures from our dependent and independent variables 
(Carreras & Bowler, 2019). 
 
We also control for behavioural factors (also known as intrinsic factors) that predict political 
participation and ideological extremism. News exposure is associated with higher political 
participation, particularly in individuals with higher education (Ahmed & Cho, 2019; Gil de Zúñiga 
et al., 2012; Hoewe & Peacock, 2020; Norris, 2000; Shah et al., 2005). The variable is measured on 
a five point scale. AmericasBarometer records it as the frequency of paying attention to the news 
in print, radio, television or online (so that “Never” (0), “A few times a year” (1), “A few times a 
month” (2), “A few times a week” (3), “Daily” (4)). The ESS registers it as time spent paying 
attention to the news (we categorise time exposure into “None” (0), “1-30 minutes” (1), “31-90 
minutes” (2), “91-150 minutes” (3), “151+ minutes” (4)). Interest in politics is a self-reported measure 
that has previously been reported in the literature as a predictor of political participation (Brady et 
al., 1995; Knobloch-Westerwick & Johnson, 2014), and has also been identified as a predictor of 
more accurate ideological positioning (Zechmeister & Corral, 2013), and is controlled using a four 
point scale in both surveys, from “Not interested” (0) to “Very interested” (4). 
Studies have shown that governing institutions have a socialisation effect on the behavioural 
and participative attitudes of their citizens (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2011; Shorrocks & Geus, 2019; 
Vaccari & Valeriani, 2018), where social and political trust are the result of a complex interrelation 
between societies and authorities (Levi & Stoker, 2000). Thus, social trust, or trust in local 
community, is controlled on a four point scale of trustworthiness in the community in 
AmericasBarometer (from “Untrustworthy” to “Very trustworthy”) and as an eleven point scale 
in ESS (from “You can’t be too careful” to “Most people can be trusted”). The measure of political 
trust is interpreted as the level of respect individuals have for political institutions, and is included 
as a seven point scale variable from “Not at all” to “A lot” of respect in the AmericasBarometer, 
and as an eleven point scale from “Extremely dissatisfied” to “Extremely satisfied” in ESS.  
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These variables are included in the second regression model to control for within country 
variation. Following the analytical strategy developed by Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2011). Between-
country variation is added in the third model of our regressions to account for cross-national 
differences in political participation and ideological extremism. 
 
4.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
In order to appropriately select the types of regression to be applied to our dependent and 
independent variables, we examine the descriptive statistics below. The data are processed using 
the Software for Statistics and Data Science (Stata/SE 14.0) package. Summarised in Table 3, the 
descriptive statistics show differences in the two regions, markedly in the dependent variable –
online political activity–, which, as explained in the variables section, is because each survey 
measures distinct online behaviours: consuming (AmericasBarometer, 73% positive responses, see 
Table 3) versus expressing (ESS, 15% positive responses) political content online. The descriptive 
statistics for the variable ‘voting’ are similar, despite obligatory voting in six of the eighteen Latin 
American countries (IDEA, 2021), and so is the political participation variable for protesting. 
There is a contrast between the remaining matched political participation variables (contact with 
politician, attendance or work with political and community institutions), and it is suspected to be 
due to the differences in question syntax (AmericasBarometer is more focused on passive political 
contact, i.e. attending meetings; whereas ESS asks respondents about their active political contact, 
i.e. sending an individual message to a politician or having worked in a politically-associated 
institutions). Ideological extremism levels are slightly more elevated in Latin America than in 
Europe. 
Regional differences in the demographic control variables reflect differences in 
socioeconomic development between middle-high and middle-low income countries. Education 
attainment and access to internet are lower in the Latin American region, while level of 
urbanisation is more elevated and mean age is eleven years younger than in Europe. Income levels 
appear similar with the regions’ means at the scales’ centres. Latin America’s platykurtic 
distribution shows higher frequencies at the 1 and 2 measures (earning more than 0 but well below 
average) compared to Europe’s similar distribution but with a higher concentration of responses 
at values between 2 and 5. It must be noted that these categories reflect different income ranges 
adapted to each country, which makes this cross-national comparison one of economic 
distribution rather than one of net income. 
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Behavioural control variables somewhat differ as well. News exposure is difficult to compare 
due to the difference in syntax, where (5) in AmericasBarometer is being exposed to the news daily, 
and (4) in ESS is being exposed to the news more than two and a half hours a day. Both are the 
maximal value in their respective categorical scales, but an individual could read the news daily for 
ten minutes and classify as the lowest exposure in ESS but as the highest exposure category in 
AmericasBarometer. For this reason the measure has value in controlling variance as an individual 
characteristic, but not in the cross-regional comparison. The remaining behavioural variables show 
lower levels of interest in politics and higher levels in social trust in Latin America, and perhaps 
surprisingly, marginally higher levels of political trust. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics. 
Variables AmericasBarometer European Social Survey 
 M SD N M SD N 
Online Political activity  
(0-1) 
0.73 0.44 (18,954)8 0.15 0.36 (49,236) 
Political participation  
(0-5 and 0-7) 
1.28 0.97 (28,042) 1.48 1.31 (49,519) 
Voted  
(0-1) 
0.72 0.45 (27,944) 0.78 0.41 (45,233) 
Protested  
(0-1) 
0.10 0.30 (27,989) 0.08 0.26 (49,298) 
Municipality / Politician 
(0-1) 
0.12 0.32 (13,900)9 0.15 0.36 (49,303) 
Political institution  
(0-1) 
0.20 0.40 (15,277)10 0.04 0.20 (49,321) 
Community association 
(0-1) 
0.30 0.46 (27,786) 0.16 0.36 (49,302) 
Badge  
(0-1) 
- - - 0.08 0.28 (49,294) 
 
8 The limited number of data is in most part due to the fact that this is a follow up question to answering positive to 
owning a social media account. The ESS question has more data because it is more open ended (asking whether the 
respondent has shared political content online, including but not limited to blogs, social media and email). 
9 Another reason to look at the political participation variables individually is because two of our variables of interest 






- - - 0.25 0.43 (49,200) 
Ideological extremism  
(0-4 and 0-5) 
1.77 1.59 (23,841) 1.64 1.56 (42,269) 
Age  
(15-99) 
39.99 16.68 (28,026) 51.07 18.65 (49,297) 
Education  
(1-3) 
1.99 0.69 (27,570) 2.12 0.77 (49,245) 
Sex  
(Female =2) 
1.50 0.50 (28,027) 1.54 0.50 (49,519) 
Internet  
(0-1) 
0.48 0.50 (27,945) 0.82 0.39 (49,472) 
Income  
(0-16) and (1-10) 
7.55 4.81 (24,970) 5.24 2.78 (39,865) 
Urbanisation  
(Big city =1, Countryside =5) 
3.02 1.53 (28,042) 2.91 1.20 (49,480) 
News exposure  
(1-5) and (0-4) 
4.34 1.06 (27,907) 1.86 1.08 (48,947) 
Interest in politics  
(1-4)  
2.11 1.04 (27,890) 2.66 0.92 (49,421) 
Social trust  
(1-4) and (0-10) 
3.55 0.66 (26,293) 5.06 2.50 (49,374) 
Political trust  
(1-7) and (0-10) 
4.55 1.94 (27,473) 5.26 2.58 (47,689) 
Note: variable scales specified in parentheses 
 
Figures 3 and 4 below show the relation of political participation and ideological extremism 
with online political activity. As can be noted from the left hand figures, both Latin America and 
Europe show a higher political participation mean (calculated from the aggregate index) in 
individuals that report positively to online political activity. Mean ideological extremism does not 
seem to be related to online political activity in Latin America, but extremism co-occurs with online 
political activity in Europe. 
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Figure 3. Relation between political participation, ideological extremism and online political 
activity in Latin America. Source: AmericasBarometer 2018. N = 28,042 (political participation);  
N = 23,841 (ideological extremism). 
 
      
Figure 4. Relation between political participation, ideological extremism and online political 
activity in Europe. Source: ESS9. N = 49,519 (political participation); N = 42,269 (ideological 
extremism). 
Below, Table 4 provides information on the levels of interactions between our key 
independent variable (online political activity) and our control independent variables. It shows a 
similarly negative relation between advanced age and online political activity in both regions, and 
a positive association with education, income and internet access. Latin America shows a more 
apparent relation between news exposure and online political activity compared to Europe. Again, 
a cross-regional divergence arises in interest in politics, where it is positively associated with online 
political activity in Latin America, and negatively associated in Europe. Overall, we can discard the 
issue of multicollinearity, as the key independent variable does not highly correlate with any of the 
control variables. The associations indicate the individual-level characteristics that relate to political 
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Table 4. Descriptive associations between control variables and the key independent variable: 
online political activity. 
 Online political activity 
 AmericasBarometer European Social Survey 
Point-biserial correlation   
Age -0.18*** -0.17*** 
Education  0.16***  0.16*** 
Income  0.10***  0.12*** 
Urbanisation  0.01* -0.06*** 
News exposure  0.12***  0.02*** 
Interest in politics  0.22*** -0.23*** 
Social trust  0.06***  0.08*** 
Political trust  0.04***  0.01 
Phi coefficient   
Sex  0.06***  0.03*** 
Internet  0.09***  0.19*** 
* p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
4.3.1. Models for statistical analyses 
 
How can the relationship between online political behaviour with political participation and 
ideological extremism in the same individuals be empirically examined? We propose to measure 
recognised and cross-nationally comparable characteristics of political participation and ideological 
positioning, to establish whether there is a significant difference in these features between those 
who are political online with those who are not. Additional demographic and behavioural factors 
are added to the analysis given that they are known to influence individuals’ political behaviour. 
National cultures of political behaviour, such as protesting or levels of trust in political institutions, 
vary according to historical legacies peculiar to each country. The extent to which these factors 
influence online and offline political behaviour is secondary to this study, but they are showcased 
in the analysis in order to deepen our understanding of their effects. 
 
To test our hypotheses, a series of regression models are estimated. For H1 and H2,  each 
dichotomous political participation variable is run using a binary logistic regression (five activities 
in AmericasBarometer and seven in ESS). To analyse the aggregated political participation index, 
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we use ordinary least squares (OLS), for its accommodating properties when dealing with complex 
data, which allows for easier interpretation of coefficients. OLS is also the most common type of 
regression applied in research on the relation between technology and political participation 
(Boulianne, 2017, p.49). Ordered logistic analyses are run as robustness tests (see Appendix). 
Similarly, for H4 and H5, we run OLS and ordered logits on our ideological positioning and 
predictor variables. To ensure comparability between the two regions (H3a and H3b), we restrict 
our variable analysis to the most similar and relevant survey questions from the two datasets, in 
order to apply analogous analytical models. It is worth highlighting that we do not make any claims 







5.1. Online political activity and political participation 
 
The first two hypotheses (H1 and H2) predict a positive relationship between online political 
activity and political participation. We begin by testing the prediction on distinct political 
participation activities (five in Latin America, seven in Europe). Holding other individual-level and 
country-level variables constant, the binomial logistic regression models in Table 5 show a positive 
significant relationship between consuming political content online and all five activities in Latin 
America. Models 2 and 4 indicate that people who consumed online political content have 45% 
better odds of having protested and 43% better odds of having attended a political meeting. In the 
remaining models, those who had seen political content online had over 20% higher odds of voting, 
attending a municipal meeting, and attending a community improvement association, all else being equal. This 
result is in line with H1. 
 
The five models also indicate that the demographic effects of individuals vary depending on 
the political activity, which highlights the importance of having examined the logistic regression 
of each variable (particularly age, sex and urbanisation). Unsurprisingly, the behavioural control 
variable with most predictive probability is self-reported interest in politics, with the highest 
prediction effects on the participation activities of having protested and attended a political meeting. 
 
Table 5. Predicting political participation activities in Latin America (imputed). 
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F 151.50 68.56 26.76 67.24 55.64 
Prob > F .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Observations 22,725 22,777 10,877 12,143 22,663 
Note: cell entries are binary logistic regression odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. Source: 
AmericasBarometer 2018.  In Model 3, the question was only asked in 9 countries, and in Model 4 the question was 
asked in 10 countries (as part of a USAID extended questionnaire). 
* p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
Table 6 shows the predicted probability of a European citizen responding positively to 
participating in a political activity, when also having shared political content online. Supporting 
H2, six of the political participation measures are two-to-three times more likely to take place 
(between 84%-245% higher odds) in individuals who have expressed political content online 
compared to those who have not. Vote is the least affected political act, but still shows an 18% 
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increase in odds of participation when having posted or shared something about politics in the last 
year. Being connected to the internet at home is also a strong predictor of political participation 
activities, in all but having worked in a political institution (party or action group). 
This pattern contrasts with the results from Latin America, where an internet connection at 
home positively predicts voting and protesting, but negatively predicts attendance to a community 
improvement association. Similarly, the behavioural predictors of news exposure, social trust and political 
trust produce different results in the two regions. In Europe, they increase the odds of participation 
in most activities, but in Latin America barely have any effect (except political trust which positively 
predicts attending political meetings and negatively predicts participation in protest). Latin America and 
Europe do coincide in the individual-level behaviour predictor of interest in politics, where it 
positively and significantly increases the odds of participation in every single activity.  
 
Table 6. Predicting political participation activities in Europe. 
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F 118.45 72.23 73.99 44.01 94.69 69.76 154.17 
Prob > F .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Observations 35,308 37,889 37,889 37,896 37,884 37,880 37,821 
Note: cell entries are binary logistic regression odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. Source: ESS9. 
* p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
To address H3a on the differences and similarities between the Latin American and 
European regions, we turn to the aggregate index analyses of political participation. Bearing in 
mind the associations identified in the above binary regression models, we expect that the OLS 
estimations of the political participation indices will also demonstrate a positive significant effect 
of online political activity in both regions. Table 7 shows that this is the case, confirming that 
political content consumption online is positively related to overall participation in Latin America. 
Europe shows a positive coefficient that is strong in magnitude in Model 1, suggesting that online 
political expression positively correlates with political participation. Introducing individual-level 
controls in Model 2 reduces the coefficient of online political activity in Europe, but not in Latin 
America. Model 3 introduces country fixed effects, to account for cross-national variation and 
provide a more accurate estimate. In both regions, online political activity remains positive and 
statistically significant across the three models.  
According to the individual-level control variables, those who are older, more educated, and 
from less urbanised areas are also more engaged in political activities. A higher interest in politics 
and a lower level of trust in political institutions also significantly correlates with an increased 
participative index. In Europe, the models estimate a positive relation between being a woman and 
higher political participation, as well as if the respondent used the internet at home. In contrast, in 
Latin America, being a man predicts participation (the significance is lost when country effects are 
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considered) and so does a lack of internet access at home. We suspect the role of the internet 
connection on political participation in Latin America to be related to the covariance between 
owning an internet connection and living in a city. A Kendall tau-b correlation was run, and 
showed a negative significant correlation (τb = -0.23, p < .000), suggesting that living in a more 
urbanised agglomeration is indeed related to accessing internet, but the relation is not as strong as 
might be expected, and thus remains an important independent control variable. 
 
Table 7. Multiple OLS regression analyses predicting political participation indices in Latin 
America (imputed) and Europe. 
 AmericasBarometer ESS 






















Individual-level demographics      
















































Individual-level behaviour       

































Country-level fixed effects   -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
  0.00 
(0.00) 
F 131.10 192.26 183.26 1197.75 404.02 370.85 
Prob > F .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Observations 27,856 22,806 22,806 49,236 37,930 37,930 
Note: coefficients represent regression estimates from OLS models, with standard errors in parentheses. Source: 
AmericasBarometer 2018 and ESS9.  
* p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
An intra-regional look at cross-country differences on the relation between online political 
activity and political participation are laid out in Figure 5. OLS regressions of the two variables 
were run for each country, controlling for individual-level characteristics, coefficients are included 
in parentheses. Online political activity is categorised as high when above 65% of a country’s 
population responds positively to seeing political content online, as medium when the percentage 
is between 60 and 65%, and low when the percentage is below 60%. Given that in most countries 
citizens participate in at least one political participation activity, the threshold of two activities was 
used to gauge differences on a binary scale. Countries that reached more than 25% of the 
population participating in two of five activities were considered high in participation, and those 
below were considered low. 







High Bolivia (0.02), Honduras (0.11) Nicaragua (0.18*)  
 
Medium 
Guatemala (0.12), Ecuador (0.07), 
Paraguay (0.18*), Peru (0.19*) 
Brazil (0.21***), Colombia (0.15), 
Costa Rica (0.16**),  
El Salvador (0.05), Mexico (0.01), 
Panama (0.06) 
Low Dominican Republic (0.06) Argentina (0.08), Chile (0.10*), 
Jamaica (0.17), Uruguay (0.03) 
Figure 5. Online political activity and political participation across Latin American countries. 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2018. * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
The bulk of Latin American countries are classed as having a medium online politically active 
population, and most populations do not participate in more than two political participation 
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activities. The low-low nexus at the bottom right of Figure 5 displays three Southern Cone 
countries, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. This positioning goes against the cognitive mobilisation 
theories that claim higher rates of education and communication promote political behaviour 
(Inglehart, 1970). However, only a third of the countries have a significant relation between online 
political activity (viewing content) and the political participation index.  
 
The same analysis with different thresholds of high-low categorisations is repeated for 
Europe, and reported in Figure 6. Online political activity is categorised as high when the 
percentage of population sharing or posting political content online is above 20%, as medium when 
the percentage is between 10 and 20%, and low when the percentage is below 10%. As with Figure 
5, the threshold of two activities was used to gauge political participation differences on a binary 
scale. Countries that reached more that 20% of the population participating in two of five activities 
were considered high (levels are overall lower than Latin America), and those below were 
considered low in participation. OLS regression coefficients are included in parentheses. 
  Political participation index 









High Denmark (0.86***), Iceland 
(0.91***), Norway (0.92***), 
Portugal (0.50***), Sweden 
(0.70***), UK (0.81***) 
France (0.83***), Spain (1.09***) 
Medium Austria (0.93***), Belgium 
(0.71***), Croatia (1.04***), 
Finland (0.95***), Germany 
(0.62***), Netherlands (0.37***) 
Czechia (1.06***), Estonia 
(0.89***), Ireland (1.29***), Italy 
(1.05***), Lithuania (0.84***), 
Serbia (1.51***), Slovenia 
(0.90***), Switzerland (0.81***) 
Low  Bulgaria (1.35***), Cyprus 
(1.33***), Hungary (0.73***), 
Latvia (0.80***), Montenegro 
(1.19***), Poland (1.44***), 
Slovakia (0.94***) 
Figure 6. Online political activity and political participation across European countries. Source: 
ESS9. * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
 65 
The high-high box in Figure 6 includes most Scandinavian countries and the UK. Portugal’s 
classification into high political participation index is the result of rounding up the percentage of 
population participating in two activities. The low-low corner pools together CEE countries, but 
still show strong significant positive relations between online political activity and political 
participation index. None of the highly participative countries have low levels of online political 
activity. The contrast between the stronger correlations in the European individual country 
regressions compared to the Latin American countries is evident, but it is important to recall that 
the European data examines online political expression rather than the Latin American data which 
measures online political consumption.  
 
Using the political participation index, OLS results confirm the binary logistic regression 
findings for each political activity. Given the uneven distribution of the online political activity variable 
for both of our datasets, running OLS also functions as a test of robustness. We conducted further 
robustness checks on the findings. An ordered logistic analysis was run on both datasets using the 
political participation index and remaining independent variables. Using ordered logistic regression 
could be deemed more appropriate than linear regression due to the ordinal nature of our 
participatory behaviour scale (ordered 0-5 for Latin America and 0-7 for Europe). However, the 
coefficients are less straightforward to interpret, and the anormal distribution of our variables 
would violate the less forgiving assumptions of ordered regression. Generalised ordered logit 
modelling is a more recent method that is less restrictive than proportional odds models (Williams, 
2016), but it has not yet been adapted to imputed or sample survey datasets, and thus is not yet 
accessible for this analysis. The result from the ordered regression indicates similar findings to 
those reported above, where online political activity predicts 35% higher odds of politically 
participating offline in Latin America, and resulted in 241% higher odds for Europeans that are 
politically expressive online to be politically participative offline (see Appendix 1, Table 9).  
 
5.2. Online political activity and ideological extremism 
 
In order to mirror the analysis of online political behaviour on political participation, OLS 
analysis is applied to our second dependent variable: ideological self-placement at the political 
extremes. Using ordinary least squares is fitting, as it is known to minimise type I errors (false 
positives) when using count dependent variables (Dylko, 2010). Our H4 and H5 stated that online 
political activity is foreseen to predict ideological identification on the political extremes of the 
left-right spectrum. 
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Results presented in Table 8 show the coefficient estimates for Latin America and Europe. 
In Latin America, Model 1 demonstrates that consuming political content on social media is 
significantly negatively correlated with ideological extremism,  which suggests that it reduces with 
extremism. This is inconsistent with H4. However, as individual-level controls are added in Model 
2, the relation becomes positive and the significance disappears. This indicates that the 
demographic and behavioural characteristics of respondents are significantly more responsible for 
individuals’ identification with the political extremes. Key correlating characteristics in Latin 
America include being older and less educated, being a woman, not having an internet connection, 
earning a lower income, living in a less urbanised area, being less exposed to the news, and a higher 
interest in politics and a higher level of social trust. The importance of individual-level traits is 
maintained when country fixed effects are included in Model 3, but the positive relation of online 
political activity and ideological extremism becomes significant. This result suggests that between-
country differences significantly account for variance in ideological positioning when measured in 
relation to online political consumption. 
In Europe, the correlation of online political activity and ideological extremism 
demonstrates a larger coefficient that holds in all three models. The inclusion of individual-level 
effects minimally reduces the correlation coefficient (by 0.05 points), and the statistical significance 
remains after the incorporation of country fixed effects (p < .000). The only individual-level 
characteristics that significantly affect ideological extremism in Europe are: having a lower 
education, not being connected to the internet, being more exposed to the news, more interested 
in politics, and having lower political trust in the current government.  
 
Table 8. Multiple OLS regression analyses for ideological extremism in Latin America (imputed) 
and Europe. 
 AmericasBarometer ESS 
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Country-level fixed effects   0.02*** 
(0.00) 
  0.02*** 
(0.00) 
F 29.67 91.12 92.42 86.18 23.08 33.83 
Prob > F .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Observations 27,856 22,806 22,806 42,121 34,108 34,108 
Note: coefficients represent regression estimates from OLS models, with standard errors in parentheses. Source: 
AmericasBarometer 2018 and ESS9.  
* p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
Aside from differences in the influence of individual-level characteristics on the relation 
between online political activity and ideological extremism, other regional comparisons are worth 
highlighting. First, we identify two similarities. Results show that in both regions, being able to 
connect to the internet at home is negatively related to ideological extremism (with a similar 
approximate coefficient of β = 0.30), while pronouncing a higher interest in politics is positively 
related to extremist positioning. Second, we find three behavioural differences. In Latin America, 
news exposure is strongly negatively correlated with ideological extremism, whereas in Europe it 
shows a weak positive correlation. This pattern suggests a regional distinction in news 
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consumption behaviour, where it increases with extremism in Europe, and decreases with 
extremism in Latin America. Another divergence in behavioural relations is the estimated 
relationship between social and political trust and ideological positioning at the extremes. Though 
the relation between ideological extremism and social trust in the community is seemingly 
inexistent in Europe, Model 3 indicates a significant positive relation in Latin America. Conversely, 
political trust has little relation with extremism in Latin America, but it is negatively correlated with 
ideological extremism in Europe. This result suggests that, while higher social trust is an indicator 
of ideological extremism in Latin America, political distrust is a better indicator in Europe (to a 
lesser magnitude). 
 
The intra-regional OLS cross-country analysis of online political activity and ideological 
extremism are arranged into Figure 7. Online political activity is categorised in the same way as 
Figure 5 for political participation in Latin America. Countries were classified as high in ideological 
extremism if more than 30% of the population positioned themselves on either political extreme 
of the left-right spectrum. OLS regressions were run for each country, controlling for individual-
level characteristics, coefficients are included in parentheses. Again, in the low-low bottom right 
corner, the Southern Cone countries appear, this time indicating a low level of ideological 
extremism. The only significant correlation is in Uruguay, showing a considerably limited country-
specific relation between online political consumption and ideological extremism. 
 







High Nicaragua (0.14) Bolivia (-0.04), Honduras (-0.03) 
 
Medium 
Brazil (0.11), Colombia (0.09), 
Guatemala (0.08), El Salvador 
(0.08), Panama (-0.09),  
Paraguay (-0.07) 
Costa Rica (-0.06),  
Ecuador (-0.07), Mexico (0.14), 
Peru (-0.08) 
Low Jamaica (0.10), Dominican 
Republic (-0.06) 
Argentina (0.19), Chile (0.01), 
Uruguay (0.25**) 
Figure 7. Online political activity and ideological extremism across Latin American countries. 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2018. * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
The same analysis with different thresholds of high-low categorisations is repeated for 
Europe, and reported in Figure 8. Online political activity is categorised the same way as Figure 6 
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for political participation in Europe. Similarly to the Latin American cross-country comparison in 
Figure 7, the threshold of two activities was used to gauge ideological extremism differences on a 
binary scale. Countries were classified as high in ideological extremism if more than 15% of the 
population positioned themselves on either political extreme of the left-right spectrum (again, 
levels are overall lower than Latin America). OLS regressions of the two variables were run for 
each country, controlling for individual-level characteristics, coefficients are included in 
parentheses. 
  Ideological extremism 









High Spain (0.51***) Denmark (0.12), France (0.28*), 
Iceland (0.29*), Norway (0.16), 
Portugal (0.43**), Sweden (0.10), 
UK (0.24*) 
Medium Croatia (0.19), Lithuania (0.48*), 
Serbia (0.47*), Slovenia (0.20) 
Austria (0.60***), Belgium (0.10), 
Czechia (0.00), Estonia (0.06), 
Finland (0.32***), Germany (0.16), 
Ireland (0.15), Italy (0.24), 
Netherlands (0.25*), Switzerland 
(0.45***) 
Low Bulgaria (0.39), Cyprus (0.31), 
Hungary (-0.11), Latvia (-0.13), 
Montenegro (0.50), Poland (0.01), 
Slovakia (0.08) 
 
Figure 8. Online political activity and political participation across European countries. Source: 
ESS9. * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
The countries in the lower two left hand boxes, classified as high ideological extremism, are 
CEE democracies. The only exception is Spain in the high-high corner, which has a high level of 
ideological extremism and corresponding high level of online political expression. The remaining 
European countries are low in ideological extremism, and none of these of low levels of online 
political activity. 
 
Similarly to section 5.1 of our findings, we apply a robustness check with ordered logistic 
regressions (see Appendix 2). These were run on imputed and unimputed data for the 
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AmericasBarometer dataset. Although the multiple imputation is carried out to strengthen our 
analysis, the mechanism assumes that missing data are missing at random. Given that the 
missingness of our dependent variable (online political activity) is driven by the lack of owning a 
social media account, the randomness of this occurring is likely to be influenced by a number of 
exogenous and endogenous factors. This might lead to the introduction of unwanted bias in our 
models. Nonetheless, the ordered logit on both imputed and unimputed datasets (Appendix 2, 
Table 10 and Table 11) align with the above-mentioned findings, and show increased odds of 
ideological extremism in Latin America when having viewed political content online (9% and 15% 
respectively). Results also hold when running the ordered logistic regression on the European 
dataset (except that social trust significantly predicts ideological extremism, Odds Ratio = 2.26, p 
= .024, and political trust becomes insignificant, Odds Ratio = 0.99, p = .260). 
 
To summarise, the above findings validate the significant role of online political activity in 
explaining ideological extremism. The relation is stronger when individuals share political content 
online, than when they simply view it. We therefore conclude that we find evidence to support H4 
and H5. In the discussion, the results are analysed in relation to previous literature, and the regional 






6.1. Key findings 
 
6.1.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
In this subsection we make brief observations on the descriptive statistics of our key 
independent variable (online political activity), dependent variables (political participation and 
extremism), and key control variables (education, internet access, urbanisation and interest in 
politics).  
Initial statistical analyses of AmericasBarometer and ESS9 survey datasets revealed that both 
Latin American and European populations are engaged with political content online. The online 
political activity variables in the two regions differ, due to a difference in question wording. In the 
case of Latin America, three quarters of respondents consumed (read, watched, heard) political 
content on social media (Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp) in the last year. Whereas in Europe, 15% 
of respondents expressed (posted, shared) political content online (social media, blogs, websites, 
email) in the last year. In both regions, the proportions are similar in a country-by-country basis. 
Although we were limited to the questionnaires’ syntax for each region, meaning that we were not 
able to gauge the levels of online media expression in Latin America and online media 
consumption in Europe, we used the online political activity indicators as representative of online 
citizen activity in each region, to serve as our point of comparison. 
Both regions showed similar rates of political participation, specifically in voting and 
protesting. It is estimated that the remaining participation variables would have been more alike, 
had there not been a difference in the question formulation (AmericasBarometer measures 
attendance to political organisation meetings and ESS9 measures working in organisations, making 
the proportions of participation in Europe about half those in Latin America). Extremism levels 
are slightly higher in Latin America than Europe, but this may be for various reasons. It could be 
due to the nature of party-system spread, which is generally less centripetal in Latin America, or 
due a mix of ideological leanings, more towards the right or left depending on the country 
(Kitschelt et al., 2010). We therefore infer this to be a trait of regional idiosyncrasy. 
Two important individual-level control variables that predict political participation and 
ideological self-placement are education and access to the internet (Brady et al., 1995; Carroll & 
Kubo, 2018). Our results showed that Latin America has overall lower levels in both of these 
variables. We also identify in the descriptive statistics that Latin America has higher levels of 
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urbanisation than Europe, a demographic trait that influences individuals’ sense of communal 
social trust (Carreras & Bowler, 2019). Upon looking at the individual-level control variables’ 
relation to our independent variable, we noted a particular cross-regional difference. There was a 
positive association of interest in politics to online political activity in Latin America, whereas in 
Europe, respondents reported a negative interest in politics in relation to online political activity. 
In other words, Latin American citizens who are consuming political content online state that they 
are interested in politics more often than those who do not. And European citizens who are 
expressing political content online are less interested in politics than those who do not express 
themselves online. We elaborate on this difference in the cross-regional implications section of 
our discussion (subsection 6.2.4.).  
 
6.1.2. Statistical models 
 
Our hypotheses were set out to investigate the information and communication effects of 
individuals’ online media use on political participation and ideological extremism. Findings suggest 
that online political activities, consumption of information and expression of ideas, positively 
relate to participation and extremism. More specifically, our empirical analysis of 47 countries in 
Latin America and Europe shows evidence of a stronger relation between online political 
expression and offline behaviours. Hereafter, we position our results in relation to each of our five 
hypotheses.   
 
Online media use in relation to political participation 
 
First, we expected a difference in the statistical relations between online political consumption 
and political participation, compared to online political expression and political participation, where 
the socialising effects of discussion with online networks were anticipated to be stronger (H2) than 
information seeking (H1). Our findings confirm these hypotheses (see Tables 5, 6, and 7). In our 
activity-by-activity statistical analysis, we found that individuals who were exposed to online 
political content were much more likely to protest or attend a political meeting than those who 
were not exposed. They were additionally more likely to vote, attend a municipal meeting and 
attend a community improvement association. All activities were also strongly predicted by 
individuals’ self-reported level of interest in politics, a result that is in line with the literature (Lu 
et al., 2016). Individuals who expressed political content online were more likely to vote, but slightly 
less so than those who consumed political content online. In the remaining participation activities, 
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respondents who politically expressed themselves online were considerably more likely to protest, 
and work in political organisations (from 56 to 192 percentage points higher). These findings were 
sustained in the aggregated participation index analysis, as well as in robustness tests. Therefore 
our political participation index results align with the literature that links online political media use 
to offline political participation activities (see meta-analyses by Boulianne, 2015, 2017; and Skoric 
et al., 2016). 
Second, we hypothesised that the contextual differences between the Latin American and 
European regions would be related to levels of democratic maturity and internet connectivity 
(H3a). Results showed positive correlations in both regions in our main analyses of online political 
activity and political participation. As with online media activity, internet connection was also 
found to be an important predictor of voting and protesting in Latin America and Europe. In 
Europe, internet connectivity was a particularly strong participation predictor for most activities 
(with the exceptions of working in a political institution or association). Other demographic 
predictors of political participation in Europe include age, sex, education, and income. In contrast 
to previous research (Espinal & Zhao, 2015), our Latin American survey results show that income 
was not closely related to political participation activities (except a positive prediction of voting 
and negative prediction of attending political meetings). Education and sex were stronger 
predictors, influencing the probability of citizens participating in four out of five of the activities. 
Unexpectedly, internet connection in Latin America negatively correlated with the aggregated 
participation index. It is difficult to deduce why this might be the case, but we suggest this finding 
is driven by the political participation activity ‘attendance to community associations’ (seen in the 
activity-by-activity binary regression analysis), as it is strongly negatively predicted by internet 
connection. We suspect this is because higher participation in community meetings is more 
common in rural areas (Carreras & Bowler, 2019), which are less likely to be connected to the 
internet. 
After our cross-regional statistical results, we deepened the analysis to briefly look at 
country-by-country correlations, in the eventuality that some countries were biasing the results of 
the entire region. In both Latin America and Europe, the countries all showed positive correlations 
(significant and non-significant) between online political activity and political participation. 
Surprisingly, the relation was not significant for the majority of Latin American countries. 
Specifically in the cases of Argentina and Uruguay, which have socio-economic conditions and 
democratic stability that led the author to expect them to show significant positive correlations 
between online political activity and political participation. This may be due to a limitation in the 
statistical design of the study, perhaps in terms of the chosen control variables which might be 
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causing internal, even municipal-level, differences to appear. However, the aim of the study was 
to approach the hypotheses with a large-scale regional focus, and thus it does not provide more 
detailed examinations of local contexts. Nonetheless, the significant relationship in a third 
Southern Cone country, Chile, aligns with previous literature on the same variables (Valenzuela, 
2013; Valenzuela et al., 2019). In contrast to Latin America, all the individual European country 
statistical results were significant. Within Europe, the magnitude of correlations in Western 
European countries was generally larger than in newly democratic CEE countries. No European 
country that categorised as ‘high’ in the political participation index had low levels of online 
political activity, which further supports the hypothesised link between political online media use 
and political participation.  
 
Online media use in relation to ideological extremism 
 
Similarly to our political participation hypotheses, we expected a difference between online 
political consumption and ideological extremism, versus online political expression and ideological 
extremism. This differentiation was based on a review of previous ideology and communication 
research. We anticipated that the influence of online communication on individuals’ extremism 
would be stronger (H5) than the influence of online information (H4). 
Our results confirm that online media use is positively related to citizen extremism. To the 
author’s knowledge, this is a previously unreported finding. Results also demonstrate that online 
political expression shows a strong and significant correlation with ideological extremism, when 
holding individual-level and country-level variables constant. In comparison, the reported 
correlation coefficient between online political consumption and extremism is smaller and less 
significant (see Table 8). This suggests that information seeking behaviour online is less related to 
extremism than online communication, aligning with our hypotheses. Checks for robustness not 
only confirmed this finding, but resulted in slightly increased odds of ideological extremism in 
individuals who consumed political content online. 
 
Cross-regional and cross-country analyses of Latin America and Europe were expected to 
reflect socio-economic differences, as well as recent trends in support for extremism. In both 
regions, extremism correlated significantly negatively with higher education and internet access, 
and positively with interest in politics. This indicates that even though political online media 
activity is linked with increased extremism, general internet access is, on the contrary, linked with 
political moderation. In other words, politically-motivated online media use is related to extremism, 
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but non-political online behaviour might be more conducive to political centrism. This supports 
the thesis that the influence of online media use on citizen ideology is a consequence of individual 
predispositions and intentions upon using online media tools (C. Lee et al., 2018). We discuss this 
further in our implications subsection 6.2.2. 
Another noteworthy similarity between Latin America and Europe is the positive and 
significant relation between interest in politics and increased ideological extremism. This 
individual-level trait positively and significantly also predicts all the measured political participation 
activities from the previous subsection. The ‘participation-deliberation’ paradox may explain this 
somewhat contradictory finding, as it postulates that homogeneity in social network discussions 
increases political participation, but also ideological polarisation (D. Mutz, 2006). Again this will 
be discussed in more detail in subsection 6.2.3. Trust also appears to be an essential feature of 
extremist tendencies in both regions. In Latin America, social trust is positively linked to 
extremism, potentially in relation to higher homogeneity of social networks in the region (Barberá, 
2015); and in Europe, political distrust correlated with extremism.  
Notable cross-regional differences in individual-level cognitive correlations with extremism 
include news exposure, social trust and political trust. Our results show that news media exposure 
is positively correlated with extremism in Europe, but negatively correlated in Latin America. We 
suspect that this is due to different preferences of news platforms in both regions. In Europe, 
levels of online news readership have increased, and as a result, have somewhat crowded out 
offline traditional news media (Liang & Nordin, 2012). Previous research has found that online 
news media increases extreme political views via the selective exposure or attitude-consistent 
mechanisms (Winneg et al., 2017). In Latin America, online news readership has increased as well, 
but citizens still widely listen to the radio and watch television news (Salzman, 2015). Despite being 
sources which also instil a bias in news consumption, traditional media do so in a less fragmented 
and ‘individually-tailored’ way in comparison to online news (Shehata & Strömbäck, 2018). In 
addition to weaker correlations, our intra-regional results show more variation within Latin 
America concerning online media-extremism. In the same way as the country-by-country 
participation correlations, the majority of Latin American countries do not show a significant 
relationship between online political activity and ideological extremism. Almost half the countries 
have negative non-significant coefficients. This suggests that varying national contexts may have 
an effect on online political activity where in some cases (although not investigated in this study), 
political online media use might promote moderation rather than extremism. In contrast, the 
relation between online political activity and ideological extremism in all European countries is 
positive, except Hungary and Latvia, and is significant in a third of them. The CEE respondents 
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mostly classified into the  ‘high’ category of ideological extremism, and many categorised as ‘low’ 
in our classification of online political expression levels. This aligns with the literature from our 
contextual analysis in chapter 3, which identified rising levels of right-wing extremism in the CEE 
subregion (Stanley, 2017), but lower levels of internet penetration than Western Europe (Surowiec 
& Štětka, 2017). The classification of Spain into ‘high’ extremism and ‘high’ online political activity 
can be explained by relatively recent party fragmentation, and the appearance of the populist and 
extremist parties Vox (far-right) and Unidas Podemos (left to far-left) in the national political arena. 
 
In summary, the results show that online political activities (consumption and expression) 
correlated significantly with political participation and ideological extremism. It is worth noting 
that the magnitude of the correlation between online political activity and extremist self-placement 
was small, compared to the effect of online political activity on political participation. We infer 
that most individuals who come into contact with far-right or far-left content online are not swayed 
into following those currents, but may be intrigued or further polarised (Bright, 2017; Liang & 
Nordin, 2012). We also reported differences between Latin American and European respondents. 
Intra-regional country-specific correlations were overall less statistically significant at the national 
than the regional level. In the following section, we discuss the implications of our findings, and 
relate them to existing literature. 
 
6.2. Implications  
 
We highlight possible implications from our findings into four main subsections: i. political 




Our results corroborate previous findings on online media use and citizen political 
participation. We base this statement on three meta-analyses, which consistently identify a positive 
link between social media use and citizen participation (Boulianne, 2015, 2017; Skoric et al., 2016). 
In these seminal meta-analyses, authors disagree on which online media behaviour is more 
instrumental: consumption or discussion. On the one hand, the 22-study review by Skoric and 
colleagues (2016), finds that online consumption is a stronger predictor of participation than 
expression. On the other hand, Boulianne’s (2017) global 133-study examination finds larger 
effects for online expression than consumption. Our study aligns with the second, more 
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comprehensive, cross-examination, given that we find higher odds ratios for almost every 
participation activity (protest, attendance to or contact with political institutions, attendance to or 
work in political organisation, attendance to or work with community improvement association, 
badge wearing, and petition signing), as well as higher correlation coefficients for the aggregate 
indexes. More specifically, our results replicate findings from two relevant studies that differentiate 
their results based on consumption and expression. Firstly, a survey of urban adults in Chile, which 
demonstrates a significant increase in political participation in individuals who use social media to 
express political opinion, compared to individuals who use them as a source of news information 
(Valenzuela, 2013). Secondly, a survey in the U.S. that finds expressive blog use is directly related 
to political participation, and informational blog use is not (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2013). A possible 
explanation for the greater influence of expression on participation compared to consumption 
might be a difference in mobilising potential of these online activities. Previous research has shown 
that news consumption can be beneficial to political knowledge, political interest and to a certain 
extent, participation (de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006). However, political expression is arguably 
more influential because it consists in putting political knowledge into discussion with others, and 
has a higher propensity to lead individuals to political action (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2013). Hence, 
through dialogue, individuals not only learn political information from their interlocutors (as they 
would from the news), but they also grow their social networks, and exercise reflection on their 
own political beliefs and efficacy. 
Our literature review pointed to some theoretical frameworks that further help explain the 
difference between consumption and expression. In both the cognitive mobilisation and civic 
voluntarism models (see chapter 2), communication networks determine individuals’ likelihood of 
learning and engaging with political information. This process, stimulated by education, mass 
media and the internet, expands on the awareness and knowledge of political systems, i.e. ‘political 
cognition’  (Inglehart, 1970; Lu et al., 2016). The transition from political thinking to political 
action is contingent upon many factors. Yet, two elements are believed to be fundamental for this 
to happen. First, social capital, which is nurtured by regular interactions with networks of family, 
friends, and acquaintances (Norris, 2000; Verba et al., 1995). Second, interpersonal communication, 
which is the precursor to action (McLeod et al., 2001). Research has shown that online media 
facilitate both, through webs of interconnected networks and repertoires of communicative action 
(Skoric et al., 2016). Theories of social capital and cognitive communication provide frameworks 
not only to explain the differences in consumption and expression we obtained in our results, but 
also to understand the directionality between the two. Shah and colleagues have extensively studied 
the empirical link between informational and communicative online media use (Shah, 2016; Shah 
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et al., 2005, 2007). They find that the most plausible direction of behaviours from thinking to 
action is: i. information seeking; ii. political discussion; iii. participation. This is a helpful schema 
to conceptualise citizen political behaviour, but we are aware that the complexities of actual 
cognitive and behavioural processes are far less straightforward. 
The greater effects of expression on participation should not lead us to undervalue the 
influence of online political consumption. Learning about politics online comes at a reduced 
financial cost for many, making it an essential resource for political knowledge. For others, online 
media offer opportunities of incidental exposure to news content. Incidentally viewing news on 
social media is positively related to engagement and subsequent discussion, at similar levels than 
for individuals who actively seek political information (Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018). Therefore, as a 
precursor to discussion and participation, online political consumption is an irrevocable part of 
the mechanism that drives citizen participation.  
 
This study, along with a number of studies before it, has demonstrated that consuming and 
expressing political content online makes individuals more likely to be politically participative, 
albeit to differing degrees. This result continues to be important link to report, as technology 
increasingly facilitates the replacement of offline behaviours with online ones, and in turn 




The previously unreported finding we present here is that online political activity correlates 
with citizens’ ideological extremism. Our results show smaller statistical relations than the previous 
subsection on political participation; nevertheless, they are positive and statistically significant, 
even when controlling for individual-level and country-level variance. Similarly to our participation 
results, we found a stronger link between extremism and online political expression, than with 
online political consumption. The literature on online media use and ideological self-placement is 
more limited, and as far as we know, meta-analyses have not been published on this subject. We 
therefore base our reflection on specific and pertinent previous findings. 
We encountered two studies on the link between news consumption online and ideology, 
one on polarisation and the other on extremism, and one study on the link between social media 
use and right-wing populism. The first two studies evaluate the effects of online news consumption 
on ideology in comparison with offline news consumption. In the polarisation study, authors 
compare news consumption trends in 12 countries, and find that individuals from left-leaning and 
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right-leaning ideologies display higher polarisation online than offline (they measure polarisation 
as the size of the overlap between news sources) (Fletcher et al., 2020). In the extremism study, 
authors use U.S. survey data to demonstrate that individuals who consume online news self-
identify as farther from ideological centrism that those who do not (Winneg et al., 2017). The 
present study’s methods do not measure online news consumption but political content 
consumption on online media. We find similar results, but the relation of online consumption with 
extremism is somewhat weak. In Fletcher and colleague’s (2020) cross-country analysis, countries 
with more dispersed news suppliers online (such as Poland and Czechia) produce more moderate 
beliefs among online consumers. Therefore, online political information environments varying 
across our study’s countries may explain our weak correlation. In the third study we identified, 
authors analyse social media use and right-wing populism, and do not find a relation with either 
online information seeking nor online discussion (Boulianne et al., 2020a). This differs 
considerably from our findings. However, a difference in measurement may explain this 
inconsistency. In our study, we measure both left and right-leaning ideological extremism, not 
populism. Conversely, Boulianne and colleagues (2020a) categorise their dependent variable as 
right-wing populism, and rank candidates in France and the U.S. (and parties in the U.K.), 
according to a cultural populism index, where they include non-extremist parties, such as ‘the 
Conservatives’ and ‘Les Républicains’ as populist. This highlights the importance of differentiating 
between extremism versus populism when conducting research on the influence of online activity.  
 
Additional insights from the literature on online extremism may help explain our findings. 
In the second above-mentioned study, Winneg and colleagues (2017) put forward that the 
influence of online media on individuals’ ideological extremism comes down to the social 
psychology of the user and the commercialised structure of internet platforms. We believe both 
components are related to patterns of consumption and expression online, and briefly discuss this 
in relation to our results. Firstly, individuals are cognitively predisposed to avoid information that 
conflicts with their opinions (Nie et al., 2010). Online media allow users to selectively expose 
themselves to attitude-consistent information, permitting them to conform with their 
psychological traits. This behaviour is further aided by the diversity of political perspectives online, 
which offer highly specialised content to appeal to different political currents and attract more 
consumers (Aalberg & de Vreese, 2016). Selective exposure theory and fragmentation theory 
explain the symbiosis of ideological variety online, where users seek attitude-consistent 
information, and online media increasingly tailor content to niche subgroups of the population 
(Papacharissi, 2010). Individuals’ ideological communication patterns also depend on cognitive 
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traits. Recent polling has shown that users with more polarised views are more likely to post about 
political issues online, and that 70% of social media users, many of them moderates, never or rarely 
post about political issues (McClain, 2021). Thus, those who identify at the ideological spectrum 
extremes are cognitively more inclined to politically express themselves online. This may explain 
our results, as only 15% of survey respondents admitted to sharing or posting political content 
online. If individuals who are predisposed to express themselves online are also more often likely 
to be polarised, it may explain our finding of a strong positive relation between online media 
expression and extremism.  
Secondly, the structure of online media platforms has also been theorised to contribute to 
extremist tendencies in consumption and expression. The economic priorities of commercialised 
online media are centred on making a profit from ‘traffic’. They are designed to maximise users’ 
time spent on them. A way in which they achieve this is by personalising ‘filter bubbles’ and 
‘clickbait’ (links with enticing titles) to the user’s preferences, including political preferences based 
on browser history (Dutton et al., 2017; Sunstein, 2018). The reduced heterogeneity in content 
suggested to the user also results in reduced political moderation in consumers (Hoewe & Peacock, 
2020). The structural influence of network homogeneity on extremism appears to be more 
important for individual expression than for consumption. We link this to two additional structural 
features. One, is the possibility of creating private spaces for like-minded people to discuss 
ideologies of interest among themselves, otherwise known as ‘echo chambers’. These structures 
have been shown to increase polarisation and extremism in their members (Bright, 2017; 
Quattrociocchi et al., 2016). The other, is the ‘virality’ mechanism in public spaces, where social 
media favour the sharing of polarising opinions over informed ones, because they are more likely 
to increase traffic (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2020; Papacharissi, 2010). The smaller effects of online 
media consumption on extremism that we find in our results could be due to the more 
heterogenous nature of public spaces on social media, despite the virality mechanism (J. K. Lee et 
al., 2014). This may also explain the negative significant correlation between individuals’ internet 
access and extremism, as information on the web is more heterogenous than in echo chambers. 
 
Beyond the immediate implications of our findings, there are also important democratic 
implications to consider. The literature has often treated extremist support as a threat to 
democracy (Aslanidis, 2016). According to party-system theories, voting for extremist parties 
manifests a weakness in the party system (Duverger 1954, Sartori 1976). When looking at 28 
democracies between 1967 and 1976, Bingham Powell (1981) found that higher extremist party 
support was associated with governing instability and mass rioting. Yet, at the same time, these 
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trends coincide with an increase in attention to reform in mainstream party policies, in an attempt 
to balance citizen opinion back in their favour (Bornschier, 2019). During this period of political 
readjustment, political discussion is fuelled by extremist candidate campaigns and redefines societal 
principles and values. The imbalance towards the extremes can thus be considered an indirect 
balancing mechanism, which enforces parties to remain responsive to evolving voter preferences. 
Uncertainty, fragmentation and extremism do not guarantee a return to stability, but in most 
mature democracies, they do not risk authoritarianism either. This rationale is known as the 
corrective democracy theory, which posits that a rise in extremism reflects a discontent and 
disenfranchised electorate, usually followed by a readjustment of mainstream party ideologies. 
 
In summary, our results show that online media use can be linked to ideological extremism, 
which at the individual level implies less tolerance for opposing views and reduced inter-group 
consensus (C. Lee et al., 2018). We contribute to fill the gap in the literature on this matter, and 
suggest that it might not have been previously investigated because of the challenges and debates 
over measures of citizen ideology (Shehata & Strömbäck, 2018). At the societal level, extremist 
support invites ideological readjustments in the party-system. In the following subsection, we 
discuss how a rise in extremism may also be connected to a reactivation of citizen participation. 
 
6.2.3. Participation and extremism? 
 
It may come as a surprise that our datasets demonstrate both a positive relation between 
online political activity and citizen participation, and simultaneously, between online political 
activity and extremism. To better understand these co-occurring results, we examine possible ties 
between participation and extremism. 
 
The link between the ideological and participative effects of online news has been reported 
in two notable studies. In one study, An and colleagues (2014) employed a mixed observational 
and experimental investigation of partisan sharing of online news content (attitude-consistent 
information) on Facebook and Twitter. The authors show evidence for echo chamber effects in 
social media towards polarisation, while also finding that online expressive behaviour increased 
political participation. In the other study, Knobloch-Westerwick and Johnson (2014) found that 
political interest was linked to attitude-consistent online news consumption, which in turn 
positively affected political participation. They also found that exposure to more heterogenous 
information in online networks, previously linked to reduced extremism (Bright, 2017), also 
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reduced participation (D. Mutz, 2006). Based on the two aforementioned studies, we deduce that 
selective exposure can foster political participation at the same time as it promotes intolerance to 
ideological opposition. 
In two additional studies, we detected that scholars investigating the influence of online 
media on political participation also report higher divides in left-right ideologies. In their study, 
Oser and colleagues (2013) explain that this is because social media are more appealing to younger 
citizens, who are generally less engaged with traditional mainstream parties, and more likely to join 
radical currents of ideology. Whereas Valenzuela and colleagues (2016) explain the increased gap 
in protest participation between left and right-wing individuals as a results of the link between 
social media and a higher tendency to protest in left-wing partisans. Although their explanations 
do not directly refer to extremism, they do note an interaction between online media use, 
participation and ideology. 
 
To deepen our analysis of results implications, we look at the co-occurrence of participation 
and extremism using theoretical frameworks of communication and engagement. First, using the 
previously mentioned cognitive communication models, we can understand how human political 
behaviour is driven by mechanisms of attraction and aversion, which are stimulated through 
discussion. Discussion, according to both the communication mediation model and the cognitive 
mediation model, promotes political learning and interest, which in turn facilitate participation 
(McLeod et al., 2001; Wang, 2007). But it is the type of discussion that determines the applicability 
of these theories. Conversation with like-minded individuals encourages polarisation and 
extremism as individuals are attracted to ideals that align with their beliefs (Quattrociocchi et al., 
2016). Contact and discussion with dissimilar-minded groups have also been found to promote 
polarisation, but with the adverse effect of strongly reducing political participation (Lu et al., 2016; 
D. Mutz, 2002). This appears paradoxical, as network diversity and exposure to opposing views is 
conducive to democratic consensus according to habermasian communicative action theory. Mutz 
(2006) argues that the deliberative and participative elements of discussion cannot co-exist in the 
same individuals, because moderate and tolerant citizens tend to be less confrontative, and are less 
likely to become combative in defence of their values. Cognitive theories justify this difference in 
behaviour, in connection with the psychological and social predispositions of each individual 
(Eveland, 2001; Jost et al., 2009). The structure of the platform is also important in the nature of 
communication that it hosts, where discussion in longer and frequent exchanges promote balanced 
exchanges, compared to short encounters, which can be polarising (again, based on 
communicative action theory, Love, 1989). 
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Second, and in line with theories of communication and ideology networking (Liang & 
Nordin, 2012; Wojcieszak, 2010), the facilitation of extremism and participation via online media 
is tied to its influence on political interest. In a panel study measuring political views of individuals 
over four years, C. Lee and colleagues (2018) show that online media indirectly affect polarisation 
through the promotion of political engagement. In a qualitative assessment of social media use in 
Latin America, Mitchelstein and colleagues (2020) argue that online platforms increase political 
learning and enable political engagement on a large-scale, while at the same time cementing 
political opinions away from the ideological centre and towards extremism and populism. In our 
study, we find that political interest strongly correlates with both participation and extremism. This 
behavioural trend is reflected in real-world observations, where a growing disenchantment with 
mainstream politics and rising support for extremist parties has frequently co-occurred with a surge 
in public engagement and (often unconventional) participation (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This 
observation might seem contradictory, as higher political participation has typically been associated 
to healthy democracy (Putnam, 2000). However, “the realm of public opinion is not simply 
optimistic or pessimistic; rather, it depends on the complex interplay between individual 
characteristics and the structural nature of the social media” (J. K. Lee et al., 2014, p. 718). 
 
Thus, digital media can spur both political participation and extremism because they offer 
users communicative tools that reinforce their views and organisational tools for collective action. 
The original contribution of our study is the provision of empirical evidence for this co-occurring 
effect of political online activity on citizen political behaviours. Additionally, we contribute to the 
generalisability of this pattern, by observing it in two different regions. We discuss the cross-
regional comparison of our findings below. 
 
6.2.4. Cross-regional implications 
 
Our results suggest that in both regions, populations are being politically stimulated online 
towards political participation and ideological extremism. Demographic and cognitive individual 
characteristics relating to these behaviours vary between regions, but common factors include 
levels of: education, internet access, interest in politics, and social and political trust. The findings 
contest previous remarks that the effects of digital media on political behaviour are momentary 
and simply relate to spikes of civil discontent or electoral campaign periods (Mitchelstein et al., 
2020). In this study’s datasets, less than half of the countries experienced a national election in the 
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year of survey implementation. In this subsection, we briefly compare the similarities and 
differences of our cross-regional results, and situate them within respective contexts.  
 
In the late 2010s, both Latin America and Europe witnessed a decrease in conventional 
participatory democracy and a widening of ideological gaps between political elites and electorates 
(EIU, 2020). This period was fuelled with popular disenchantment and frustration with 
unrepresentative institutions. The two regions also saw a rise in popular protests, with an increased 
use of social media in partisan efforts to coordinate and engage citizens. In Latin America, 
widespread unconventional political participation had previously come to fruition in the late 1990s, 
during a regional political turn in favour of the left. In the 2010s, many of the pink tide 
governments that had benefited from citizen engagement in previous decades were then criticised 
for corruption scandals and mismanagement during their mandates. Online media use 
accompanied the revitalisation of Latin American citizen participation, most visibly during the 
2012-2013 protests, which used abbreviated labels (hashtags) to attract larger membership, and in 
the recent 2019-2020 demonstrations that spread information and communicative threads 
throughout the region (Valenzuela et al., 2016).  
In Europe, discontent with political elite and a rise in protests have been linked to grievance 
and cultural backlash theories (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). The political 
tensions can be explained by long-term and short-term factors. Globalisation, a phenomenon 
growing since the 1990s, propelled a perceived incrementing divide between winners and losers, 
particularly in Western Europe. This gradually rising sentiment was joined by the sudden 2008 
economic crisis and the 2014 immigrant crisis, which accentuated citizen dissatisfaction and 
alienation from national and supranational governments (namely, the European Union). In Latin 
America and Europe, populist and extremist party support grew, as a result of dealignment 
between incumbents representation and citizen demands (Barboni & Treille, 2010; Waisbord & 
Amado, 2017). The use of social media by these candidates and protesting citizens also attracted 
attention to the influence of technological tools of behaviour (Chadwick, 2017; Miller, 2020). From 
this review, similarities between Latin America and Europe in recent citizen political sentiment 
and frustration are noticeable. During this period, and in both regions, scholars have incrementally 
investigated the growing use of online media by citizens and politicians in the transition towards 
new political climates (Cantijoch, 2012; Espinal & Zhao, 2015; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2019; 
Mitchelstein et al., 2020; Vaccari & Valeriani, 2018; Valenzuela et al., 2016).  
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Despite these broad similarities identified in the literature, there are several noteworthy 
differences between the regions that explain our results. We focus on two contextual differences 
that we find relevant for our comparative analysis: internet penetration and democratic maturity. 
First, overall internet penetration (internet connection in the average household) is more elevated 
in Europe than in Latin America (88% in Europe, 66% in Latin America) but Latin America has 
higher penetration levels of social media (41% in Europe and 51% in Latin America), suggesting 
that internet connection is more synonymous with social media use in Latin America than in 
Europe (Internet World Stats, 2019). That said, within Latin America there are several countries 
that have particularly low levels of internet penetration, such as Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela. This may explain why these countries 
have been found to have the lowest reported levels of social media use during times of protest 
(Masías et al., 2018). Unexpectedly, in our results we find that Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua 
classify in the ‘high’ online political consumption category that we designed (compared to Southern 
Cone countries, which classify as ‘low’). This inconsistency could be due to distinct purposes that 
citizens give to social media, which could include informal channels for news information in 
otherwise censored environments. Further research is needed to understand political online media 
usage in these countries. Likewise, more research is needed on understanding citizen political use 
of online media in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In spite of generally having lower levels of 
internet penetration than Western Europe, some countries such as Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Hungary, Kosovo and Ukraine, have been officially reported to have rates of average internet 
connectivity above 80%, which might be an avenue for future investigations on online media and 
citizen political behaviour (Internet World Stats, 2020).  
Second, Europe generally has better records for freedom of expression, press and assembly 
than Latin America, which are characteristic of mature democracy. In a comparison of ‘established’ 
versus ‘third wave’ Western European democracies, Vaccari and Valeriani (2018) find that 
institutional legacies shape the relation between online media use and participation, where ‘third 
wave’ democracies overall show significantly weaker correlations between online discussion and 
participation than established democracies. In line with this democratic maturity argument, 
Europeans in our study’s cross-regional comparison showed significantly stronger correlations of 
participation and extremism with online media use than Latin Americans. We also perceive a 
connection with the Latin American context of a recent rise in political protest but drop in civil 
liberties (EIU, 2020). It is possible that during this time, online media have not only been a source 
for political socialisation, but a matter of learning and sharing information on protest and 
opposition organisation (Ahmed & Cho, 2019; Valenzuela, 2013). This difference is further noted 
 86 
in the intra-regional country results.  Many Latin American countries did not show significance in 
the correlation between online media use and participation, and even fewer did in the statistical 
analysis with extremism. 
Another difference that may be related to democratic maturity is the generally higher levels 
of self-reported extremism in Latin America than Europe. Latin America has a historical past of 
volatile party-system stratification due to shifts in ideological spread of parties over the past 40 
years (Coppedge, 1998; Kitschelt et al., 2010). Although changes in ideological meaning assigned 
to the spectrum affects citizens’ ability to self-place their ideological preferences and build party 
attachments, the growing political cleavages that have risen from extremism aid citizens to increase 
in political cognition (Hinich & Munger, 1996; D. C. Mutz & Martin, 2001). This helps individuals 
perceive a more accurate ideological self-placement (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007). “By clarifying 
the political alternatives, polarization creates strong links between parties and voters, and thereby 
instils mechanisms of accountability” (Bornschier, 2019, p.153). This argument is based on 
democratic theory, the future of ideological placement of citizens and parties in the region remains 
uncertain. Within the regions, socio-economic and democratic contexts of Latin America and CEE 
are more similar than Western Europe. Yet, the benefits of polarisation and extremism for 
democracy in CEE are arguably different to those in Latin America. Our intra-regional results 
show ‘low’ political participation, ‘high’ extremism, and ‘low’ online political activity for most CEE 
countries. The instability in party-systems and democratic values are a testament to the shorter 
lived popular satisfaction with the transitions in the 1990s, and lingering ethnic and religious 
differences (Stanley, 2017; Surowiec & Štětka, 2017). This context renders CEE less adept for 
party-system ideology readjustment than Latin America (Kitschelt et al., 2010). 
 
In summary, this study’s cross-regional examination provides innovative and generalisable 
results linking citizen political behaviours, participation and ideological extremism, to online media 
use. We base this claim on the reliability of the comparative and cross-regional citizen behaviour 
research methods we used (Curtice, 2007; Lijphart, 1975). We also detect interesting contextual 
differences in each region. Western Europe’s higher internet connectivity and democratic maturity, 
explain the stronger links between online media use, participation and extremism in our results. 
Latin American and CEE countries have a history of less stability, but provide more possibilities 







While the present study brings new insights, the analysis also has its limitations. We outline 
three methodological limitations to be noted. 
First, our results depend entirely on self-reported measures. The issue with self-reported 
answers is that they rely on respondents’ honesty and recall. Misreporting behaviour is common, 
particularly in routine activities such as news exposure, where individual and contextual 
characteristics influence self-reporting (Vraga & Tully, 2020). This has repercussions on the 
validity of the research. However, the advantage of using surveys is that they provide a standardised 
set of carefully planned out measures, allowing for the monitoring of multiple individual 
characteristics, beliefs and behaviours in sample populations. In other words, it facilitates 
generalisations of trends. Most observational studies, and particularly of large-scale analysis, 
continue to use self-reported measures as an accessible and expediate method. Self-reported 
measures are specifically insightful in the study of online behaviours, given that most online 
platforms have strict privacy regulations that prevent researchers from extracting data (with the 
exception of Twitter) (Tucker et al., 2018). Both the AmericasBarometer and ESS9 surveys were 
carried out face-to-face, a method which increases the likelihood that people answer the entire 
questionnaire (Valenzuela, 2013, p.927), but also makes them vulnerable to social desirability bias 
(Vaccari & Valeriani, 2018, p.5). Admittedly, every method has its limitations, and results must be 
treated with discretion. The datasets our study employed are observational in nature, which means 
that our results show correlation but not causality. Nonetheless, they are both highly recognised, 
and regularly cited and sourced from to conduct socio-political research.  
Second, the AmericasBarometer and ESS9 questionnaires are designed for equal 
implementation in all countries of their respective regions, in the most unified manner possible. 
This is favourable to improving the quality of quantitative cross-comparison (Curtice, 2007), but 
it ignores country-specific, and more locality-specific differences (Ahmed et al., 2020). In our study 
we chose to keep the two datasets separate, as combining them would have increased the erasure 
of context-specific differences. This methodology still allowed us to develop a cross-regional 
comparison, and to complement our findings with intra-regional country comparisons. The 
comparative aspect of the study was arguably limited in the key independent variable, measured as 
online political consumption in Latin America and online political expression in Europe. Future 
studies would preferably obtain both measures in both regions in order to confirm our results. 
Third, part of the AmericasBarometer dataset was incomplete, due to a number of missing 
values. Missing data typically arise when respondents refuse, or do not know the answer. But in 
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the case of the AmericasBarometer dataset, the missing values correspond to the people who do 
not have a social media account. We believe this to be an issue that can be confronted with 
question wording in the forthcoming survey round. The commonly used statistical procedure of 
multiple imputation assisted our analysis. Multiple imputation uses the distribution of data to 
estimate multiple values and mirror the uncertainty of true values (UCLA, 2021). By using this 
method, and running other statistical models to check the robustness, minimised bias and 
increased the reliability of our results (reported in the Appendix). Limitations notwithstanding, the 
approach to the research design and statistical analyses was adapted to optimise the quality of 




Based on the innovative results and the cross-regional scope of our study, we suggest three 
possible directions for future research. First, our analysis pinpoints the need for deeper 
understanding of the use of online tools and radicalisation in Latin American and CEE countries 
that have been for the most part ignored. Special attention should be given to low-income 
countries that have seen growth in internet access in the last few years. Although it is likely that 
similar patterns of behaviour will influence these increasingly connected populations, its effects on 
participation and extremism are worth examining, in order to re-assess theoretical frameworks of 
online information and communication. Such research could also consider using qualitative 
methods, to offset the overwhelming majority of quantitative studies in the literature. Second, 
additional longitudinal work needs to be developed on the effects of information and 
communication technology on political behaviour. Some studies have produced results over four 
or five year terms (C. Lee et al., 2018; Liang & Nordin, 2013), but decade-long studies should now 
be within reach, and could perhaps enable the comparison of inter-generational cohorts. This 
would provide a better indication of the potential ways that technology will influence individuals 
and societies in decades to come. And third, research must continue to promote findings that 
differentiate the ways different platform structures affect political behaviour (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 
2019; Vaccari & Valeriani, 2018). This will help scholars understand why and how certain 
populations prefer a social medium over another for political engagement (Newman et al., 2020). 
A step that the present author would personally like to pursue is an experimental study to test the 
diagram designed in Figure 2, to further explore how different platform structures foster more 
homogenous or heterogenous social networks, and whether these simultaneously affect 




The general objective of this study was to identify and examine the influence of using online 
media tools on two patterns of citizen political behaviour: participation and ideological extremism. 
On the first behaviour, an extensive literature has been published, mostly stemming from research 
in the U.S. This literature has confirmed the importance of online media in promoting citizens’ 
political participation (such as voting, protesting, participation in political meetings, signing 
petitions, among others). On the second, there is a limited amount of scientific evidence linking 
online media use with ideological extremism. The existing literature is conflicting, with some 
accounts pointing towards increased extremism, and others indicating a tendency towards 
moderation. The context of a global rise in extremism and populism further provided a 
justification for our investigation. Given that most studies in the field on both behaviours have 
been carried out in the U.S. and Western Europe, we chose to focus on Latin America, a region 
with highly reported levels citizen participation; and chose to compare it to Europe, a region on 
which scholarly evidence that has shown a relation between online media and political participation, 
and has experienced a recent rise in right-wing extremism. To analyse these two regions, we 
replicated methods of evaluating online media effects on citizen political participation using 
representative sample social surveys, and expanded the design to our comparisons of interest, 
online media use, political participation and ideological extremism.  
 
In these final remarks, we summarise the main results from our study, its implications in the 
wider literature, and our future recommendations. Our main finding in this study of 47 countries 
was that online political activities positively correlates with citizen political participation and self-
reported ideological extremism. Binary and multiple regression analyses demonstrated that online 
political expression is more strongly related to both participation and extremism, compared to 
online consumption of political content. The results also generally showed stronger correlations 
of these relationships in Western European countries than in CEE and Latin American countries. 
Taken together, the results confirmed our hypotheses. The principal innovative finding from our 
study is that the same online activities, consumption and expression, can be predictors of markedly 
different offline political behaviours, participation and extremism. This result might initially seem 
paradoxical. Using theories of cognition, communication and networking, we argue that 
polarisation and ideological extremism are processes that can align with individuals’ predisposition 
to become more politically participative within more homogeneous groups. 
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In our cross-regional comparison, similarities in correlations support the generalisability of 
our findings. Yet, two contextual differences that influence region-specific variance are detected. 
These are internet penetration and democratic maturity. These are believed to influence the extent 
of online media mediation of citizens’ access to political participation and ideological positioning. 
The empirical findings of this study make a contribution to understanding of the role of online 
media on citizen behaviour in two world regions. We suggest that future research avenues might 
explore online political activity trends in less frequently studied Latin American and CEE countries, 
or evaluate platforms’ structural differences to explain homogenous and heterogenous network 
influence on behaviour. We believe our findings raise questions worth pursuing, particularly given 
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Appendix 1: Robustness checks of political participation analyses. 
 
Table 9. Robustness checks for predicting political participation indices in Latin America and 
Europe. 
 AmericasBarometer ESS 
 Imputed Not imputed Not imputed 











































Individual-level behaviour    































F 174.51 151.16 302.61 
Prob > F .000 .000 .000 
Observations 22,806 16,252 37,930 
Note: cell entries are ordered logistic regression odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. Source: 
AmericasBarometer 2018 and ESS9. 
* p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
 
Appendix 2: Robustness checks of ideological extremism analyses. 
 
Table 10. Robustness checks for ideological extremism indices in Latin America. 
 Imputed Not imputed 
 OLS (reported) Ordered logit  OLS Ordered logit  

























































Individual-level behaviour     









































F 92.42 79.59 44.13 38.86 
Prob > F .000 .000 .000 .000 
Observations 22,806 22,806 14,411 14,411 
Note: cell entries are regression estimate coefficients for the OLS models and odds ratios for the ordered logistic 
regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. Source: AmericasBarometer 2018.  
* p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
 
Table 11. Robustness checks for ideological extremism indices in Europe. 
 OLS (reported) Ordered logit 





























Individual-level behaviour   
 116 




















F 33.83 34.11 
Prob > F .000 .000 
Observations 34,108 34,108 
Note: cell entries are regression estimate coefficients for the OLS models and odds ratios for the ordered logistic 
regressions, with standard errors in parentheses. Source: ESS9. 
* p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
